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JUDGING, EXPERTISE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
CHAD M. OLDFATHER

 
INTRODUCTION 
We live in an era of hyper-specialization. Professionals across a 
spectrum of fields focus on mastering and practicing in narrow 
subspecialties.
1
 This is hardly a surprise. As the scale of knowledge grows, 
it becomes increasingly difficult for any one person to stay on top of 
details and developments across a field, and specialization represents 
something of a natural division of labor. Law is no exception.
2
 Bar 
associations have large numbers of sections to serve the needs and 
interests of lawyers who practice within narrow fields,
3
 and large law firm 
websites commonly tout the specialized knowledge of their practice 
groups and individual lawyers.  
Courts, too, have become specialized.
4
 The federal judiciary features, 
for example, the Federal Circuit, bankruptcy courts, and tax courts. At the 
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 1. The phenomenon of the expert in a narrow field, or “technocrat,” is hardly new.  
The increasing complexity of production systems, managerial decision-making, and military 
preparedness has made the technical expert, with his esoteric knowledge, a key figure in our 
society. Even the realm of political decisions has become so overwhelmed with information, 
study groups, and research reports that legislation and political decisions have come under the 
influence of the expert. 
Robert Perrucci, Engineering: Professional Servant of Power, 14 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 492, 
492 (1971). 
 2. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 
YALE L.J. 1244, 1249 (1968) (noting that “[n]o lawyer could grasp the whole of the legal system 
because the system became simply too big” and attributing the system’s bulk primarily “to population 
growth, economic development, and social diversity”); Deborah L. Rhode, The Profession and Its 
Discontents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1337 (2000) (“In many fields of law, increasing complexity has 
encouraged increasing specialization. Lawyers know more and more about less and less, and their 
intellectual horizons have correspondingly narrowed.”). 
 3. The A.B.A., for example, has a wide range of sections, divisions, forums, centers, and 
commissions focused on different types of practitioners. See ABA Groups, AM. BAR. ASSOC., http:// 
www.americanbar.org/groups/view_all_groups.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012). 
 4. Judicial specialization is, to a degree, the product of the same factors driving specialization 
throughout society. Yet, as Lawrence Baum has argued, on the whole “the movement toward greater 
judicial specialization has been a product of inadvertence rather than design.” LAWRENCE BAUM, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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state level, there are the Delaware Chancery Court and the Texas and 
Oklahoma Courts of Criminal Appeals, as well as family courts, drug 
courts, and probate courts. Indeed, Judge Posner has suggested that if (or 
when) the federal caseload becomes too great, “the federal judiciary will 
perforce switch to the European model of specialized courts. For 
specialization enables an indefinite increase in caseload to be more or less 
effortlessly accommodated. . . .”5 Yet, despite the larger trend toward 
specialization, the iconic American judge remains a generalist. She sits on 
a court of general jurisdiction and adjudicates whatever disputes happen to 
come before her. 
In recent years, however, there has been something of a backlash 
against the increasing division of intellectual labor. Dr. Jerome Groopman, 
for example, has suggested that “[s]pecialization in medicine confers a 
false sense of certainty.”6 Specialists, he argues, are just as susceptible to 
cognitive biases as nonspecialists, yet are overconfident in their 
diagnoses.
7
 Across an array of fields, critics contend that increasing 
specialization has left us with practitioners who too often fail to appreciate 
the big picture, and who cannot adequately integrate their narrow 
perspective concerning a situation into the larger framework necessary to 
generate optimal solutions.
8
 In light of this, it seems appropriate to 
reconsider the virtues of the generalist judiciary, an institution that, viewed 
 
 
SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 5 (2011). Baum concludes that the primary driver of specialization is “an 
interest in shaping the substance of judicial policy.” Id. at 207. Pressures toward increased 
specialization are likely to be a product of caseload pressures as well. The business of the judiciary has 
increased in quantity to the point where adherence to all the adjudicative procedures of an earlier era 
is, as a practical matter, impossible. Courts have implemented a number of reforms to address these 
volume-related problems, including (at the appellate level) curtailment of oral argument and the 
widespread use of so-called “unpublished opinions.” See generally, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994); William M. 
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the 
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996). The nature of judging at the trial court 
level has likewise changed, as evidenced by “the vanishing trial” and the rise of managerial judging. 
See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal 
and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
 5. Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 
1050 (2006). 
 6. JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW DOCTORS THINK 153–54 (2009). 
 7. Id. at 150, 154. 
 8. E.g., Eliot Freidson, The Reorganization of the Professions by Regulation, 7 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 279 (1983). Jeff Lipshaw has explored related issues in the context of assessing the problems 
posed by interdisciplinary judgment and decision-making. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Venn Diagram 
of Business Lawyering Judgments: Toward a Theory of Practical Metadisciplinarity, 41 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 1 (2011); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, 
Causation, Law, and Judgment, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 299 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
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against the backdrop of our increasingly specialized society, might seem to 
be something of an anachronism. 
There already exists a relatively large body of literature outlining 
proposals for specialized courts and otherwise considering their perceived 
virtues.
9
 I seek in this Article to engage this literature in two ways. First, I 
hope to demonstrate that the question of specialization is much more 
complex and contingent than most previous discussions have allowed.
10
 
The question is never just whether specialists will outperform generalists 
in some abstract sense—it instead requires consideration of an array of 
factors, such as the nature of the field of specialization, the institutional 
context in which specialization is to be implemented, and so on. There are 
also questions, distinct from any differences in the substantive results 
achieved via the two types of courts, about whether the two types of 
regimes are likely to differ in the extent to which they advance rule-of-law 
values. The goal of this analysis is to work away from, rather than toward, 
confident conclusions. Many of the questions involved are ultimately 
empirical in nature, and all will require comprehensive study. I offer 
intentionally speculative hypotheses about potential differences between 
specialists and generalists, with the hope that what results can serve as a 
catalog of factors to be considered in efforts to develop specialized courts 
and an agenda for future scholarly efforts.  
 
 
 9. The most prominent pieces in the literature considering the question at a general level 
include: RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 245–46 (1996) 
[hereinafter POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS]; Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: 
Neutral Reforms or Efforts to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217 (1991); Paul D. Carrington, 
The Obsolesence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe Pound’s Structural Solution, 15 J.L. 
& POL. 515 (1999); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377 
(1990) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication]; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Henry J. Friendly, Averting 
the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1973) [hereinafter Friendly, Averting the 
Flood]; Henry J. Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer—Newly Become Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218 (1961) 
[hereinafter Friendly, Reactions]; Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 
745 (1981); Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of 
the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989); Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts 
of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 776 (1983) [hereinafter Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive]; 
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1111 (1990); Simon Rifkind, A Specialized Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized 
Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425 (1951); Sarang Vijay Damle, Note, Specialize the Judge, Not the Court: A 
Lesson from the German Constitutional Court, 91 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2005). 
 10. Baum’s recent book is an important exception. He expressly acknowledges that “[t]he effects 
of specialization may be contingent on variables such as the specific form that specialization takes in a 
particular court, the other attributes of a court, and the conditions under which the court does its 
work.” BAUM, supra note 4, at 40. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, I examine in greater detail one of the primary claims made in 
favor of specialized courts and judges, namely that they facilitate expert 
decision-making for the simple reason that judges on specialized courts 
will be (or will become) experts in the subject matter within the court’s 
jurisdiction. Those making the case for specialization in the past have 
suggested, without much elaboration, that because of their expertise 
specialized judges will make better decisions, with “better” left largely 
undefined. I draw on research into the psychology of expertise to explore 
whether specialized courts and judges really can be expected to generate 
better decisions, and conclude that the case for expertise is overstated. 
Simply put, specialized judges will almost always have a claim to 
expertise in the weak sense that they will be more efficient in reaching 
conclusions than non-experts. These efficiency gains can be substantial, 
and they may sometimes be of dispositive weight in a world of rising 
caseloads. But, it is unlikely to be the case that the content of specialists’ 
decisions will differ in some qualitative respect from—or be in some 
general sense “better than”—those of their generalist counterparts. At the 
same time, there may be process aspects of specialists’ decision-making 
that should give us pause, and that must be balanced against the 
efficiencies gained through specialization. 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines some 
of the initial definitional difficulties embedded in discussions of judicial 
specialization, and briefly reviews the primary arguments offered for and 
against specialization. Part II offers an assessment of the specialization 
debate that is designed to enlarge both the breadth and depth of the 
inquiry. Part III surveys psychological research on expertise, with an eye 
toward gleaning its insights relevant to judging. Part IV synthesizes the 
work of the preceding two parts, drawing on both to further refine the 
analysis while introducing the suggestion that the choice between 
specialization and generalism is likely to have rule-of-law consequences.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE 
A. The Scope (and Slipperiness) of the Inquiry 
An initial difficulty with assessing the merits of judicial specialization 
is that there is no ideal type of specialized (or, for that matter, generalist
11
) 
 
 
 11. We might imagine that American judges have always been generalists—that in some 
relatively broad sense they were required and prepared to adjudicate any dispute governed by law. 
That is undoubtedly accurate as a depiction of what the American judiciary has looked like through 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
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court.
12
 It is relatively easy to take a rough cut at defining generalist 
 
 
most of our nation’s history. For much of our nation’s history, there simply was not that much law, and 
as a consequence it was not unrealistic to expect an individual to gain mastery over all of it. Judge 
Friendly used this observation as the basis for the suggestion that law professors might be better suited 
to the bench than practicing lawyers.  
[W]hereas it was not unreasonable to expect a judge to be truly learned in a body of law that 
Blackstone compressed into 2400 pages, it is altogether absurd to expect any single judge to 
vie with an assemblage of law professors in the gamut of subjects, ranging from accounting, 
administrative law and admiralty to water rights, wills and world law, that may come before 
his court. Even the most experienced twentieth century judge, as he pirouettes among all these 
topics, must often feel himself a proper target for Dr. Johnson’s shaft—‘It is not done well; 
but you are surprised to find it done at all.’ 
Friendly, Reactions, supra note 9, at 220 (quoting BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 287 (Everyman’s ed. 
1925)). Of course, the focus of the typical law professor has shifted considerably since the time that 
Friendly wrote, such that he would likely not view the matter in precisely the same way were he 
writing today. His point about the wide array of subjects confronting the judge still stands.  
 Even so, while the term nowadays connotes the lack of specialization characteristic of judges on 
courts of general jurisdiction, our casual acceptance of that role as a natural baseline overlooks a 
struggle earlier in our history over the nature of law and judging. See John H. Langbein, Chancellor 
Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 566 (1993) (describing the struggle 
in the early years of the American republic between those hostile to legal doctrine and the 
professionalization of law and “those who understood that the intrinsic complexity of human affairs 
begets unavoidable complexity in legal rules and procedures”); see also Charles H. Sheldon, Due 
Process and the Lay Judge, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 793 (1988). The very fact that professional training 
is a prerequisite to most judicial positions represents the privileging of one form of generalism over 
another. Specialization, in turn, can take various forms as one further narrows the scope of a judge’s 
responsibility away from the open subject matter of the legal generalist. Specialization can occur at 
varying breadths. A business court would arguably be less specialized than a patent court and a 
criminal court less so than a family court.  
 There is something of a temporal component to specialization as well. No judge on a generalist 
court begins his judicial career as a generalist in the sense that he has equal familiarity with the subject 
matters underlying all the disputes he will be required to adjudicate, and most such judges likely come 
to the bench from a relatively specialized practice that has provided no exposure to many subjects. One 
consequence is that the judges on generalist courts are arguably not generalist judges to the extent that 
the court’s jurisdiction would imply, although with respect to individual judges the phenomenon 
becomes less pronounced over the course of a career. Another is that a certain amount of de facto 
specialization takes place on generalist courts, whether by the happenstance of a trial judge getting a 
case in an area in which she has experience or the more intentional practice of a judge on an appellate 
panel being assigned to write the opinion in a case as to which she has experience. See generally 
Edward K. Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519 (2008). 
 12. In a sense, the difficulty begins with the concept of a judge, a term that connotes not some 
unified and uniform role, but rather one with varied responsibilities occupied by people with a wide 
array of qualifications and experience. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: 
Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1914 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“[T]he 
judicial function . . . exemplifies an ‘essentially contested concept’ that requires normative and 
institutional articulation. How we choose to define that institution depends on our collective 
commitments and our resolved needs . . . .”). There are, to take just one example, considerably more 
non-lawyer judges in the United States than most observers are likely to be aware of. See Nigel J. 
Cohen, Nonlawyer Judges and the Professionalization of Justice, 17 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 19, 19–
20 (2001); Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Disorder in the People’s Court: Rethinking the Role of Non-
Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court Civil Cases, 29 N.M. L. REV. 119 (1999). And in the case 
of multi-member courts, it may make sense to draw a distinction between the court and the individual 
judges on it, in the sense that the attributes of a collection of judges may amount to more (or less) than 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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courts: those with judges who have no designated subject-matter 
specialization (whether as a product of a jurisdictional limitation or 
otherwise), and who must accordingly hear and decide cases presenting 
virtually any legal issue.
13
 Specialization, in contrast, involves a host of 
variables. Courts might be specialized in accordance with traditional 
boundaries between legal subject matters, such as tax law, or in 
accordance with features of the cases they hear that are not strictly legal, 
as might be the case with courts designed to hear cases involving scientific 
or business matters.
14
 Specialization could likewise occur at varying 
breadths. One could imagine courts designed to hear, for example, only 
private law, or tort, or personal injury cases. It hardly seems farfetched to 
imagine that each of these variations would have differing effects on 
judges, processes, and outcomes. The nature of the bar that appears before 
the court seems likely to matter as well. The specialized court that hears 
cases primarily or exclusively through a specialized bar will be different 
from its counterparts that confront a generalist bar or a significant number 
of pro se litigants. The advocates play an important role in framing 
disputes and providing the raw materials of decision, and changes in the 
manner in which those inputs are provided will almost certainly manifest 
themselves in a court’s output. A final evident variable is whether the 
court at issue is a trial or appellate court. Because of their different roles 
and orientations toward the dispute—trial courts will be relatively more 
focused on facts, appellate courts on law—it is easy to anticipate that 
specialization raises different concerns and would have different 
consequences in the two contexts. In all, careful consideration reveals that 
the question of what is at stake in the choice between generalism and 
specialization is more complex and contingent than previous analyses tend 
to recognize. 
The concept of expertise is likewise slippery when applied to the 
judiciary. Although commentators tend to employ the terms “expert” and 
 
 
the sum of its parts. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and 
the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).  
 13. As a descriptive matter, state appeals court judges probably come closest to pure generalism, 
but even they are precluded from hearing disputes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
 14. See Damle, supra note 9, at 1277. For proposals for such courts, see, e.g., Ad Hoc Committee 
on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947 (1997); 
Victor Williams, A Constitutional Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially Expand and 
Subject Matter Specialize the Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling Our 
National Houses of Justice and Establishing a Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 535 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
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“expertise” as though their meanings are self-evident,15 their casualness 
masks considerable uncertainty and complexity. Some writers have 
suggested that the relevant expertise pertains to the process of judging 
itself, such that what is implicated, by its nature, is some relatively general 
skill.
16
 It may exist in slightly different forms as between trial and 
appellate judges, but on this view, the expertise is trans-substantive.
17
 
Another approach regards judicial expertise as subject-matter specific, 
such that a judge might be viewed as an expert in, say, criminal law but 
not tax. One might also adopt a hybrid approach that conceives of judicial 
expertise as multi-dimensional. 
Regardless of how one conceives of expertise, additional questions 
follow. Does “expertise” denote what is merely a relative status, or is there 
some qualitative difference that separates experts from all varieties of 
novice? If expertise is subject specific, how far does a given expert’s reach 
extend? How does one become an expert? Is experience the key, or is it 
largely a product of innate skills? If the former, and given the lack of any 
formal judicial training in the United States, is it experience as a lawyer 
that makes one an expert, or is it necessary to have experience as a judge? 
In theory, at least, most of these questions could be assessed empirically. 
Yet, assessing the quality of a judicial decision, and thus measuring many 
of the dimensions and effects of expertise, involves both practical and 
theoretical difficulties that counsel in favor of tentative, incremental 
assessment.
18
 
As all this suggests, the concepts in play are elusive, and a wide range 
of variables will impact the performance of judges and judicial systems.
19
 
A comprehensive taxonomy, while theoretically possible to develop, 
would make for cumbersome analysis. Some simplification is thus in 
 
 
 15. “Most commentators treat the concepts of expert and expertise as non-problematic. The 
concepts are presented as predetermined, temporally and spatially stable, quite often obvious, and even 
natural.” Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Experts and Expertise in Legal and Regulatory Settings, in 
EXPERTISE IN REGULATION AND LAW 1 (G. Edmond ed., 2004). 
 16. “I accept unreservedly that our judges are specialized—to judging. . . . [T]he judge will have 
a skill at judging that comes from long practice in evaluating arguments of counsel, decisions of trial 
judges, and trial records, and that skill is a legitimate fruit of specialization in the function of appellate 
judging.” POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 9, at 248–49. 
 17. By which I mean simply that it would apply to the act of judging regardless of variation in 
subject matter, size, or other aspect of the case. Cf. Stephen M. Subrin, The Limitations of 
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 377, 377–78 (2010) (defining transsubstantivity in procedural rules, then outlining and 
critiquing the case for it). 
 18. See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text. 
 19. See Edmond & Mercer, supra note 15, at 2 (elaborating on the assertion that “[q]uestions 
around what counts as expertise and who is an expert need to be examined in context”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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order. The discussion that follows, for the most part, will use the terms 
generalist and specialist in the informal sense in which they are typically 
used. That is, generalist will refer to the prototypical American judge who 
sits on a court of general jurisdiction, while references to specialized 
courts will contemplate those devoted to adjudicating some narrower 
segment of cases, defined by legal or factual subject matter. The analysis 
will focus on probing the nature and components of judicial expertise and 
their implications for the nature of judicial decision-making, all while 
attempting to remain agnostic on the question of which regime will 
generate better decisions. 
B. The Arguments for Specialized Adjudication 
Broadly speaking, there are two types of arguments made in support of 
specialized adjudication. The first stems from the perceived expertise that 
specialized judges will bring to their task. Here, the claim is that 
specialists will make decisions that are in some qualitative and categorical 
sense better than those made by generalists. The second involves 
efficiencies arising primarily from specialists’ familiarity with the factual 
or legal contexts in which the cases before them arise. This argument does 
not depend on specialized judges having any unique insights. The 
suggestion instead is that specialists will be able to resolve cases more 
quickly because they will start each case with a higher baseline of 
pertinent background knowledge. 
1. Expertise-based Arguments 
The expertise-based argument for specialization proceeds largely on 
the assumption that the complexity of the law generates the need for 
specialization. As Judge Henry Friendly put the matter more than three 
decades ago, this argument turns on whether the concepts embodied within 
the applicable law “are readily within the reach of any competent 
lawyer.”20 The complexity may be apparent on the surface of a statutory 
scheme, or may involve deeper difficulties in determining how a particular 
case fits within the doctrinal and policy contours of the applicable body of 
law.
21
 Either way, the clear suggestion is that the specialist possesses a 
perspective that is inaccessible to the generalist, and that the specialist will 
 
 
 20. Friendly, Averting the Flood, supra note 9, at 639. 
 21. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 747. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
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accordingly reach better results in individual cases.
22
 As one commentator 
has recently put it:  
Obsession with the generalist deprives the federal judiciary of 
potential expertise, which could be extremely useful in cases 
involving complex doctrines and specialized knowledge. . . . [E]ven 
if expert judges cannot necessarily ensure right answers, their 
decisions are more likely to fall within the subset of better answers 
owing to their greater experience and understanding of a field.
23
 
Commentary making the case for specialization tends not to linger over 
the precise nature of the likely differences between the decisions of 
generalists and specialists, or to ponder approaches to measuring their 
relative quality.  
A related but distinct argument in favor of specialization is that 
specialized courts will generate law that is more authoritative. In part, this 
draws upon the same depth of understanding believed to underlie the 
capacity for better decision making in resolving individual cases. That is, 
the specialist’s greater understanding of the larger legal landscape 
applicable to a dispute will enable her to generate better law in resolving 
that dispute.
24
 Although here again the precise qualitative metric tends to 
remain undeveloped, commentators have suggested that specialists will 
generate law that is more uniform and predictable.
25
 That, in turn, will 
enable those who must comply with the law to structure their affairs 
accordingly,
26
 and will facilitate the settlement of the disputes that do 
arise.
27 
On top of all this, a specialized court will be better positioned “to 
understand when it is better to sacrifice accuracy (the ‘right’ result in 
every case) for the ease with which bright-line rules can be applied and 
how to draw the fine distinctions necessary when accuracy is more 
 
 
 22. See BAUM, supra note 4, at 33 (identifying expertise as one of the “neutral virtues” 
associated with specialization, and contrasting it with efficiency). “When commentators speak of 
judicial expertise as something more than a source of efficiency, what they really mean is that expert 
judges will produce higher-quality decisions than nonexperts.” Id. 
 23. Cheng, supra note 11, at 524; see also Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial 
Specialization, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 1676 (2009) (“What commentators generally mean when they talk 
about expertise seems to be the possibility that expertise will enhance the quality of court decisions: 
more expert judges, who know more about the field in which they are deciding cases, are more likely 
to get decisions right.”). 
 24. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 378. 
 25. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 748. 
 26. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 378; Friendly, Averting the Flood, 
supra note 9, at 639. 
 27. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 748–50. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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important than administrative convenience.”28 In short, the suggestion is 
that the specialist will possess a more comprehensive understanding of the 
complex legal machinery governing a subject, and will consequently be 
better able to tinker with that machinery in ways that will improve its 
performance.
 
 
There is also another variety of expertise-based argument. This 
argument depends less on the complexity of the applicable law and more 
on the complexity of the factual situations to which judicial expertise must 
be applied. Proposals for science and, to a lesser degree, business courts 
proceed from the understanding that the relevant complexity resides in 
factual settings rather than doctrinal complexity.
29
 Yet the case for 
specialization remains the same—“expert” judges will be able to reach 
better decisions and generate better law because of their superior 
understanding of one of the key adjudicative inputs. The suggestion, here 
again, is that expertise will facilitate decision making in contexts that are 
beyond the capacity of generalists to understand. 
2. Efficiency-based Arguments 
Efficiency-based arguments for judicial specialization do not depend 
on the existence of qualitative differences between the outputs of specialist 
versus generalist courts. Instead, the claim is that specialized courts, 
because of their familiarity with the relevant legal or factual framework, 
will reach decisions more expeditiously. Put somewhat differently, while 
generalists courts could achieve the same level of quality as specialized 
courts, doing so would require an additional investment of time that might 
be unwise or impracticable given institutional constraints.
30
 
Consistent with this rationale, some specialized courts are largely the 
product of overwhelmed dockets. The rationale for drug (and other 
 
 
 28. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 378. 
 29. See, e.g., Andrew W. Jurs, Science Court: Past Proposals, Current Considerations, and a 
Suggested Structure, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–16 (2010) (surveying the history of proposals for 
science courts); Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient 
Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947, 951 (1997) (referring to both complexity in “real-life social and 
economic activity” and complexity in legal doctrine as justifications for the creation of business 
courts). 
 30. Of course, efficiency-based justifications for specialization overlap to some extent with the 
expertise-based arguments. Judges who are experts will be more knowledgeable about either the legal 
or factual contexts in which cases arise and thus will be able to address them more expeditiously. See 
Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 378 (“If, as common experience suggests, experts 
are better than laymen at dealing with matters in their special areas, the specialized judiciary should 
handle cases more efficiently, thereby reducing the number of judge-hours required to decide any 
given number of cases.”). 
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problem-solving) courts may be partly rooted in the sense that there is 
something unique about the judicial role in the types of cases involved, but 
such courts owe their existence in part to the overwhelming volume of 
drug cases.
31
 One can tell a similar story about probate and bankruptcy 
courts, which to a great degree involve the processing of large numbers of 
largely uncontested, routine matters.
32
 
There are also efficiency arguments that operate on an institutional 
level. For example, many commentators have suggested that there is a 
ceiling on the number of judges an appellate court can have while 
remaining functional.
33
 When this ceiling is reached, specialization is 
necessary not as a result of any expertise-based gains, but simply because 
a system that does not allocate at least some of its cases by channeling 
them to specialized courts cannot function.
34
 A court that has grown too 
large will find it difficult to coordinate its decision-making and otherwise 
keep abreast of itself. Further, the judges, unable to deliberate in a 
meaningful fashion, will start to act more like members of a legislative 
body.
35
 Judge Posner has suggested that these factors make a trend toward 
specialization inevitable.
36
 
C. The Arguments Against Specialized Adjudication 
The case against specialized courts and judges has four main 
components, which include: the potential for insularity; the prospect that 
specialized courts will have, in general, inferior judges; the suggestion that 
arguments based on expertise do not apply to the judicial role, at least in 
some contexts; and a concern over boundary and other administrative 
problems that will often arise in the wake of a separation of some portion 
 
 
 31. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Jeffrey A. Fagan, Problem-Solving Courts: From Innovation to 
Institutionalization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501, 1501–02 (2003) (identifying three “institutional 
imperatives” behind the rise of drug court: (1) docket pressures created by the war on drugs; (2) the 
perception “that the crush of drug cases led to a crisis in the courts;” and (3) judges’ dissatisfaction 
with limitations placed on their sentencing discretion). 
 32. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 767–78. 
 33. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 377–78; Posner, Will the 
Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 762–63. 
 34. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5, at 1050; Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, 
supra note 9, at 762–67. 
 35. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 762. Note that this 
conclusion is not universally accepted. See generally, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. 
Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996) (arguing that suggested difficulties associated with expanding the size of 
the federal judiciary are overblown). 
 36. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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of cases from the broader judicial system. As is the case with arguments in 
favor of specialization, many of these arguments overlap with one another. 
1. The Potential for Insularity 
The concern over insularity arises from the potential for judges on a 
specialized court, cut off from the broader legal world, to lack the ability 
to gauge when doctrine has fallen out of step.
37
 At the same time, because 
the areas of law most likely to be given over to specialized courts will be 
technical in nature, the public and the bulk of the bar are unlikely to 
monitor these courts’ output closely.38 The likely result is a bench and bar 
whose understandings are apt to be self-reinforcing—who are less inclined 
to question shared premises, more likely to develop an internal and 
potentially impenetrable language, and otherwise generally disposed to 
facilitate the evolution of their institution in such a way as to move it away 
from the mainstream.
39
 For example, it may be that those who practice in a 
certain specialty are unified with respect to how governing statutes are to 
be interpreted, and follow that approach to its logical conclusion while the 
rest of the legal world experiments with a variety of approaches.
40
 This 
institutional seclusion leads to further pathologies. Not only is the 
possibility for cross-pollination across areas of law reduced,
41
 but so are 
the chances for percolation of theories and approaches that occur through 
their consideration by a range of different courts.
42
 This lack of access to 
competing perspectives, in turn, increases the likelihood that the 
specialized court will generate suboptimal law even apart from the effects 
of insularity on the lawmaking process by depriving it of bases on which 
to reconsider prior decisions. 
 
 
 37. See, e.g., Rifkind, supra note 9, at 425 (“In time such a body of law, secluded from the rest, 
develops a jargon of its own, thought-patterns that are unique, internal policies which it subserves and 
which are different from and sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the general law.”). 
 38. Jordan, supra note 9, at 748. 
 39. See supra note 37. 
 40. Baum refers to this in terms of “assertiveness”: 
Specialized judges who come to a court with experience in the subject matter of their court’s 
work or who develop that experience as judges can be expected to feel greater confidence in 
their judgment than their generalist counterparts. Because of this confidence, they are likely 
to be more assertive than generalists in their policymaking. 
Baum, supra note 23, at 1677. 
 41. “Cross-pollination among legal theories is a significant source of change in the law since 
important patterns of reasoning sometimes emerge rather naturally in one field, yet can be 
meaningfully applied to other areas.” Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 379. 
 42. See id. at 380; Jordan, supra note 9, at 748. 
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The dynamic extends beyond the lawmaking process. The specialized 
judiciary is likely to go about the process of finding adjudicative facts 
differently from a generalist judiciary, because the specialized judiciary 
will bring differing background understandings to the task.
43
 It may not be 
possible to generalize about precisely how these differences will play out. 
To the extent that specialists within a given area share certain features in 
their backgrounds, their adjudicative factfinding might exhibit a broad 
consistency that would be lacking from generalists. Some features of 
consistently present fact patterns are likely to be ignored as familiar and 
irrelevant by those habituated to the patterns, while the non-specialist 
looking at the situation with “fresh eyes” might regard such a feature as 
significant. On the other hand, the existence of competing “camps”44 
within a specialty introduces the possibility of greater volatility, although 
it would likely be a more predictable, consistent volatility when contrasted 
with the perhaps more random volatility of a generalist court.
45
 Some 
specialists would regard a specific situational feature as critical, while 
others would view it as insignificant or significant in a different way.  
There is likely to be another difference between specialists and 
generalists in terms of the process of adjudicative factfinding. As 
developed below,
46
 the specialist is likely to undertake such factfinding at 
a greater level of particularity. Because of her exposure to a larger number 
of similar situations in the past, she is likely to regard more of the features 
of the present situation as potentially significant inputs to the just 
resolution of the dispute.
47
 If the features that the specialist regards as 
significant are different from those identified in the governing legal 
rules—if, for example, the specialist finds ten features of a given situation 
significant to the process of deciding a case, in an instance where the 
applicable rule of law suggests that decisions will turn on three factors—
 
 
 43. See Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of 
Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547–59 (1987). 
 44. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An 
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1170–71 (2004) (noting the 
existence of a division between two methodological approaches on the court). 
 45. The implications of this are less than clear. As Davis points out, the background 
understandings that judges bring to the determination of adjudicative facts will often be outcome-
determinative. Id. at 1549. This can put parties lacking the resources or expertise to contest 
background understandings at a disadvantage, an effect that is likely to be greater in litigation before a 
generalist court because it will be more difficult to predict the background understandings of generalist 
courts as a general matter. While the background understandings of specialists are perhaps more likely 
to be deeply held, and thus more difficult to move, they will at least be more predictable, such that 
litigants will have notice that they ought to address them. 
 46. See infra Part II.B 
 47. See infra text accompanying notes 83–88. 
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this, too, could lead to a divergence between specialist and generalist 
regimes. 
2. The Potential Inferiority of Specialists 
The suggestion that judges on specialized courts will be inferior to their 
generalist counterparts has two strands. The first has to do with the 
perceived prestige of a position on a specialized court. As discussions 
concerning the potential expansion of the federal judiciary have 
underscored, prestige is an important part of what makes a judicial 
position attractive.
48
 Several commentators have suggested that specialized 
judgeships are apt to be regarded as less desirable based on the repetitive 
nature of the cases likely to make up the court’s docket49 and the related 
likelihood that positions on specialized courts will be regarded as less 
prestigious than those on generalist courts.
50
 As a consequence, the pool of 
potential judges for such a court will not include the most talented 
lawyers, and thus the talent level on any given specialized judiciary will be 
less than that of the generalist judiciary. One might continue this critique 
by suggesting that the nature of the job will exacerbate the problem. Being 
faced with a continuing stream of cases involving the same subject matter 
and roughly the same sorts of problems might more readily lead to 
desensitization. In this view, specialized judges will come to view a 
greater fraction of the cases before them as routine, compared with their 
generalist counterparts. Because we all tend to engage less deeply with 
that we regard as routine,
51
 the argument would run, specialists will give a 
greater portion of their docket less than an ideal amount of attention. In 
sum, the limited nature of specialized courts’ caseload might make the 
positions less desirable at the outset, and beget a comparatively lower 
level of performance from judges once they are on the bench. 
 
 
 48. As one commentator has explained: 
Because a federal judicial appointment represents a considerable financial sacrifice for top 
lawyers, its appeal must lie in its prestige and in the opportunity it offers to enhance the 
development of the law. The prestige of a federal judicial appointment has necessarily 
declined inversely to the number of authorized positions. 
Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal Justice by 
Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485, 1496 (1995) (reviewing THOMAS E. BAKER, 
RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEM OF THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1994)). 
 49. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 381. 
 50. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 381; Jordan, supra note 9, at 748.  
 51. See, e.g., Ellen J. Langer, Minding Matters: The Consequences of Mindlessness-Mindfulness, 
in 22 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 137, 137 (1989). 
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The second component of the argument focuses on the selection 
process. Here, the suggestion is that most members of the bar and general 
public are unlikely to pay great attention to a specialized court, which in 
turn produces a greater opportunity and incentive for repeat players to 
influence the selection process in such a way as to facilitate the creation of 
a court filled with judges who will rule in their preferred way.
52
 When the 
government is one of the interest groups, there also arises the potential for 
a less effective separation of powers because specialist judges might be 
more likely to identify with the governmental interest when a government 
program is at stake. The rationale for this proposition is that the existence 
of the program is likely central to their career in a way that will not be true 
for generalist judges with respect to most of the matters that come before 
them.
53
 Both of these effects might be enhanced by geography, in that 
specialized courts—particularly at the appellate level—are likely to be 
located at the seat of government.
54
 These geographical differences can 
affect personnel. In other words, the appointees to a court located in a 
capital may differ in material ways from those to a court located 
elsewhere, and the presence of a court in a capital city might affect the 
worldview of those who must move there to accept an appointment.
55
 
Specialization will likely result in more geographic homogeneity as well, 
since the lawyers who possess the requisite specialization will tend to 
come from an urban practice, and often a particular sort of practice.
56
 
 
 
 52. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 379–80; Jordan, supra note 9, at 
748; Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 783. 
 53. Judge Posner has commented that: 
The federal courts play their role as a buffer between the political branches and the citizen 
more effectively when they are composed of generalists than when they are composed of 
specialists. A generalist court provides some insulation; a specialist court is apt to be a 
superconductor. Specialists are more likely than generalists to identify with the goals of a 
government program, since the program is the focus of their career. They may therefore see 
their function as one of enforcing the law in a vigorous rather than a tempered fashion. In this 
respect the case for a generalist federal judiciary resembles the case for the jury—not despite, 
but because of, its lack of expertness. 
Posner, Will the Federals Court of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 785. 
 54. Id. at 786. 
 55. For example, in an effort to determine whether there was any substance to the notion of a 
“Greenhouse effect” (that is, drift toward liberalism due to press coverage) on Supreme Court justices, 
Lawrence Baum studied justices who were appointed by Republican presidents since 1953 and served 
for at least ten years. He found the evidence to be “for the most part . . . consistent with the claims of a 
Greenhouse effect. Among the nine Republican justices who moved to Washington to join the 
Supreme Court, there were clear and substantial increases in liberalism for four and more limited or 
ambiguous increases for three others.” LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 149 (2006). 
 56. See DONALD D. LANDON, COUNTRY LAWYERS: THE IMPACT OF CONTEXT ON PROFESSIONAL 
PRACTICE 128–29 (1990); Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances Kahn Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the 
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3. Skepticism Concerning the Value of Expertise in Law 
The third critique of specialization calls into question the notion that 
expertise is a meaningful concept in the context of a specialized judiciary. 
One version of this critique proceeds from skepticism regarding whether 
there is such a thing as expertise in law, or at least some areas of law. The 
suggestion is that legal reasoning has a core ideological component, 
coupled with the observation that the notions of expertise and 
specialization do not seem to apply to ideology.
57
 As Judge Posner puts 
the point:  
We think of a specialist not just as someone who knows a lot about 
a subject, but as someone to whom we are willing to entrust 
important decisions about it that affect us. This willingness depends 
on a belief that the specialist is objective, in the sense that his 
judgment is independent of personal values that we may not share, 
and that is not a sense that most people have about experts in 
constitutional law.
58
 
Put differently, if expertise in law consists of the ability to fashion better 
arguments in favor of results that are ultimately a product of ideology 
rather than the ability to reason toward objectively better results, then the 
gains from expertise are, at best, illusory. 
On this view, not only is the concept of subject-matter expertise 
suspect, but the fact that it is really ideology at work exacerbates the 
potential for interest groups to capture a court through manipulation of the 
selection process in such a way as to lead to the selection of their 
ideologically preferred candidates.
59
 Of course, many of the commentators 
pressing this critique recognize that not all fields of law are created equally 
when it comes to the extent of underlying ideological conflicts. In areas 
where there is consensus on the premises underlying and policy goals 
driving the law, there is perhaps more room for objective expertise to 
develop, and thus for the implementation of specialization.
60
 The relative 
maturity of a field will also matter. There may be greater variance between 
specialized and generalist courts (measured by the manner in which they 
 
 
Control of Litigation, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 535, 546 (1993). 
 57. See Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 780. 
 58. Id.  
 59. See id. at 781–82. 
 60. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 784. 
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resolve disputes and the legal standards they develop for doing so) in 
emerging fields of law than in established fields of law. 
A different strand of this critique acknowledges the existence of 
judicial expertise, but contends that it is trans-substantive and operates at a 
more general level. Judge Friendly argued that “[t]he process is more 
important than the subject matter; and the judge can lay claim to being a 
specialist in that.”61 The idea here is that the relevant expertise exists with 
respect to law and legal analysis in a broad sense, and is based on the 
implicit understanding that there is a commonality to law and legal 
standards. The essence of this view was colorfully captured by Justice 
Holmes: “I have long said there is no such thing as a hard case. I am 
frightened weekly but always when you walk up to the lion and lay hold 
the hide comes off and the same old donkey of a question of law is 
underneath.”62 The generalist, perhaps, has the virtue of being able to cut 
through the seeming uniqueness of any given new situation to reach the 
conclusion that what it presents is ultimately just another variation on a 
familiar theme. 
4. Boundary Problems 
The fourth critique of specialization concerns the phenomenon of 
boundary problems. The creation of courts whose jurisdiction is limited by 
subject matter requires the drawing of lines to distinguish cases falling 
within the court’s jurisdiction from those that do not. Further difficulties 
arise because disputes as they arise in the world, and as they present 
themselves to the legal system, do not regularly conform to the lines of 
division that might exist within an institutional structure.
63
 This creates not 
only potential administrative difficulties, but also the possibility that 
specialized courts will develop their own, divergent body of case law with 
respect to issues that arise with some regularity in cases coming before a 
specialized court, but that are formally outside the court’s area of 
specialization.
64
 
 
 
 61. Friendly, Reactions, supra note 9, at 222; see also supra note 16.  
 62. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 11, 1909), in 1 HOLMES-
POLLOCK LETTERS 155, 156 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 2d ed. 1961). 
 63. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 748. 
 64. See Jordan, supra note 9, at 748–50; Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, 
supra note 9, at 787. 
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5. A Fifth Approach: Emphasizing the Virtues of Generalism 
Another way to approach the comparison, which has largely remained 
only implicit in the literature, is to focus on the perceived virtues of 
generalist courts. Many of these are simply the converse of the critiques of 
specialization just described. For example, if specialists are susceptible to 
insularity and selection pressures, then the mere absence of those can be 
regarded as a virtue of generalists. But there are also affirmative virtues 
that arguably result. The generalist seems much more likely to be, in 
Isaiah Berlin’s famous typology, a fox (someone who knows many things) 
rather than a hedgehog (someone who knows one big thing).
65
 She will 
bring a greater array of perspectives and cognitive tools to any given 
question. If one accepts the proposition that law—perhaps especially 
statutory law—reflects a variety of competing and often conflicting aims,66 
then the generalist stands as more likely to be sensitive to and take account 
of these divergent ends. 
 
 
 65. The reference, of course, is to the distinction popularized by Isaiah Berlin.  
For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single 
central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they 
understand, think and feel—a single, universal, organising principle in terms of which alone 
all that they are and say has significance—and, on the other side, those who pursue many 
ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, 
for some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or aesthetic principle. 
These last lead lives, perform acts and entertain ideas that are centrifugal rather than 
centripetal; their thought is scattered or diffused, moving on many levels, seizing upon the 
essence of a vast variety of experiences and objects for what they are in themselves, without, 
consciously or unconsciously, seeking to fit them into, or exclude them from, any one 
unchanging, all-embracing, sometimes self-contradictory and incomplete, at times fanatical, 
unitary inner vision. The first kind of intellectual and artistic personality belongs to the 
hedgehogs, the second to the foxes. . . .  
ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF HISTORY, 
reprinted in THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 436, 436–37 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 
1999). 
 66. One commentator has explained: 
It is sometimes true that purposes are not hard to discern. But in difficult, controversial cases 
. . . there is generally no consensus regarding statutory purpose. Many statutes are 
compromises between conflicting purposes; many are the product of overlapping purposes 
that diverge in particular applications. Often a statute enacted for one purpose has unforeseen 
side effects. Indeed, when a case goes to court, this is generally an indication that different 
interests in society favor different understandings of purpose. It is not often true that only one 
of these understandings is reasonable. 
Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2405 (2006) (reviewing STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERRPRETING 
OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). 
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This approach in turn raises the question of what the notion of expertise 
might mean in the judicial context. The specialist’s knowledge will be 
comparatively narrow and deep, and the generalist’s knowledge broad and 
shallow. The specialist will have a deeper appreciation for how a given 
case fits within the constrained universe of her specialty (in terms of both 
its legal and factual contexts),
67
 while the generalist will have a greater 
appreciation for how a given case fits within the larger framework of the 
law, and how it may be similar in important respects to legal approaches 
outside the specific legal subject area in which it arises. Although most 
discussions of judicial expertise casually assume that true expertise 
requires the specialist’s depth,68 that assumption depends on a certain 
conception of the role of law that is not inevitable. Indeed, as developed 
below,
69
 if one accepts the proposition that law should be something of a 
common language,
70
 then it may be that judicial expertise can exist only at 
a broad level. On that view, the key is not expertise in, or familiarity with 
the particulars of, say, tax law, that matters, but rather an advanced ability 
to deploy the tools of legal analysis. 
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DEBATE  
Although the outline sketched in the preceding Part is somewhat 
truncated, it accurately captures the depth of the debate over the virtues of 
specialization. Intuitive judgments abound.
71
 Yet, as the discussion 
reveals, there are tensions among some of the arguments, and conditions 
and qualifications to be assigned. For example, the suggestion that 
 
 
 67. Such expertise seems likely to play out in three ways: (1) as expertise that will enable the 
judge to best make sense of the factual aspects of a particular dispute; (2) as expertise that will enable 
it to best make sense of the larger factual background and context in which the legal framework 
operates (legislative fact expertise; the sort of expertise that will facilitate the law declaration 
function); and (3) as expertise with respect to the content of the existing legal framework (e.g., 
complex regulatory schemes; this is the sort of expertise that might be called error correction or 
evasion expertise). A generalist appointed to a specialized court is likely to be able to acquire the third 
kind, but not so easily the first and second. 
 68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 69. See infra notes 240–42 and accompanying text. 
 70. I am not the first to use the language metaphor. See Friendly, Reactions, supra note 9, at 222 
(“Any further development of such exclusive specialized courts seems likely to be in areas where a 
separate language is required—tax law, as it appears to some, because of the intricacy of the 
legislation, or patents because of the increasingly technical nature of some of the raw material.”). 
 71. See BAUM, supra note 4, at 210 (“To the extent that participants in the policy-making process 
think explicitly about how specialization might affect court outputs, they tend to act on the basis of 
folk theories that rest on common-sense notions of causality rather than on extensive and systematic 
analysis.”). 
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specialized courts are likely to foster a variety of groupthink
72—members 
of the bench and bar will argue from shared premises—stands in tension 
with the suggestion that specialized courts will be hotbeds of competing 
factions susceptible to wild swings in approach as the power of the 
factions wax and wane.
73
 Both stories read as plausible accounts, and one 
can even imagine a world in which both are at least partially true, though it 
seems unlikely that both would be accurate with respect to all specialized 
courts. Another example: the argument about the potential for capture of 
specialized courts at the selection stage suggests that specialized courts 
will tend to be less independent than generalist courts.
74
 Yet Martin 
Shapiro suggests that specialization will foster the appearance of judicial 
independence, at least in public law cases, on the grounds that a member 
of a specialized judiciary is less likely to appear closely allied with the arm 
of government with whom a litigant is engaged in a dispute.
75
  
A further problem arises out of the fact that it remains difficult to 
assess the quality of judicial output, which in turn makes it challenging to 
provide concrete support for arguments that one approach to institutional 
design is superior to another. As noted above, to some degree this 
difficulty stems from the ideological content of many areas of law, such 
that assessments of quality are to a large degree in the eye of the 
beholder.
76
 The more general problem of legal indeterminacy contributes 
to the problem as well.
77
 Legal rules, in a manner that is independent of 
ideology, can often be interpreted in multiple ways, with none of the 
possible interpretations being clearly the correct one.
78
 And there is, on top 
of all this, a measurement problem. Even assuming the ultimate existence 
of a correct answer to any moderately complex legal problem, efforts to 
assess whether a given decision has reached that answer requires deep 
knowledge of both the applicable law and the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case involved. This requires, at a minimum, fully 
 
 
 72. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 73. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text. 
 75. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 27 (1981). 
 76. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 77. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
AND LEGAL THEORY 488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1999). The problem of indeterminacy includes to a 
metaphysic component, which is implicated by the possibility of the lack of any truly “correct” 
answers to some legal questions, and an epistemic one, which relates to our inability to ascertain the 
right answers to questions. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 134 (1990). 
 78. “There is almost always a zone of reasonableness within which a decision either way can be 
defended persuasively, or at least plausibly, using the resources of judicial rhetoric.” Posner, supra 
note 5, at 1053. 
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understanding the facts, the parties’ arguments, and the governing legal 
materials. Thus, it requires an assessment process involving as much effort 
as the court’s decisional process.  
Movement beyond assessment of individual cases to a focus on the 
output of a court in more general terms presents even more difficulties. 
The decision in a specific case can at least be measured by the fit between 
the result reached and the set of potential results allowed for under 
applicable legal standards. Reviewing the collective output of a court, in 
contrast, might entail not only some effort to assess the quality of its 
decisions in individual cases—which, given the resource-intensive nature 
of the process as just described, requires resort to proxies in order to be 
practicable—but also monitoring for larger trends in the way in which 
cases are resolved. Over time, a court might change the content of the law 
or, less obviously, alter the results it reaches by shifting emphasis in the 
way standards are implemented. The desirability of such shifts, too, is the 
sort of thing that lies in the eye of the beholder. And lying behind all of 
these potentially intertwined effects are questions about causal factors. As 
Dreyfuss puts it: 
[E]ven if one is comfortable examining the court’s work and can 
comment with confidence on the ways in which the court has 
altered the law, there remains the problem of deciding whether the 
observed changes occurred because of the court’s expertise, 
experience and deep appreciation of the issues at stake, or because it 
has been captured by special interests, or has succumbed to another 
one of the problems outlined above.
79
 
It would thus be difficult to assess the effects of specialization even were 
one to engage in a comprehensive, retrospective analysis of decisions. 
Questions of institutional design, of course, require prospective 
forecasting of effects, which introduces additional complexity. Predicting 
the relative impacts of specialization versus generalism, then, is 
necessarily a speculative and contingent matter. The remainder of this Part 
thus represents an effort primarily at outlining hypotheses for how the 
choice between the two regimes might manifest itself in the output of the 
courts. Doing so necessarily involves addressing issues that are ultimately 
either normative or empirical in nature, and that accordingly cannot be 
conclusively addressed at this stage. The point of the discussion that 
 
 
 79. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 384. 
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follows is not to achieve resolution, but rather to explore the dynamics of 
the choice at a deeper level and to demonstrate the complexities involved.  
The task must begin with recognition of the purposes that courts exist 
to serve. One of the shortcomings of the existing literature is that it tends 
to speak to questions of generalization versus specialization without 
adequate sensitivity to these functions or the way in which allocation of 
responsibility for serving them is allocated amongst the different courts in 
the judicial hierarchy. In the traditional depiction, courts serve two 
primary purposes. The first is dispute resolution.
80
 It is hardly an 
overstatement to suggest that the primary function of the American 
judicial system, at least in the civil context, is to provide a peaceful means 
of resolving disputes.
81
 That, in turn, implies a concern with accurate 
resolution (bracketing for now the question of precisely what “accurate” 
means), for the simple reason that disputants will resort to the system only 
if it generates results within some tolerable range of accuracy.
82
 The 
second purpose is the creation and refinement of legal standards—the law 
declaration role.
83
 As a result of institutional design and justiciability rules, 
courts serve the law declaration function almost exclusively as a by-
product of dispute resolution.
84
 Even so, these functions often pull in 
different directions, and it may well be that the normative case for a 
generalist judiciary is stronger with respect to one function. In similar 
fashion, the arguments apply differently at each level of the judicial 
pyramid simply because the functions are emphasized to differing degrees 
at each tier.
85
 Trial courts primarily serve the dispute resolution function, 
supreme courts serve the law declaration function, and intermediate 
appellate courts fall somewhere in the middle.
86
 
There may be some aspects of the generalist/specialist divide that will 
make one model or the other more (or less) suitable with respect to both 
functions. Much of the case for specialization rests on the assumption that 
specialists’ greater subject-matter expertise provides a comparative 
 
 
 80. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 640–47 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
2001); Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937–38 (1975). 
 81. See SHAPIRO, supra note 75, at 1 (suggesting that the basis of courts’ social logic and 
political legitimacy stems from their dispute resolution function). 
 82. Cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the Duty to 
Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 137–38 (2005). 
 83. See Scott, supra note 80, at 938–40. 
 84. See HART, JR. & SACKS, supra note 80. 
 85. See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 66–67 (2010). 
 86. Precisely where depends on whether the system under consideration is federal or state, and if 
the latter, which state. 
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advantage in the fulfillment of both functions, and that understanding 
seems to be at least partially accepted in the literature.
87
 In this depiction, 
the specialist will be better able to cut to the heart of factual disputes and 
navigate complex doctrine. This arguably allows the specialist to 
outperform the generalist with respect to both functions. But this reasoning 
may be based on a misidentification of the nature of the relevant expertise. 
The specialist will have a greater familiarity with either or both of the 
governing law and the factual context in which disputes arise. As noted 
above,
88
 however, substantive knowledge may not be the key to good 
judicial decision-making. It may be, as explored below,
89
 that decision-
making skill exists apart from substantive knowledge. There could be, of 
course, a positive correlation between the two. But it might also be the 
case that it is the generalist, with broad exposure to a range of legal 
problems, who is best positioned to cultivate this sort of expertise. Or 
perhaps decision-making skill bears no necessary relation to the presence 
or absence of concentrated substantive knowledge. 
Although the literature has focused primarily on whether specialized 
courts and judges will generate better decisions measured in substantive 
terms, it is worth considering whether there are likely to be differences in 
the processes by which those courts and judges go about their jobs that 
might manifest themselves in other aspects of their output.
90
 One might 
imagine, for example, differences between the two regimes in terms of 
how broadly the average judge in each searches for the information used to 
decide a case. It could be that, on average, generalists and specialists will 
differ in terms of the extent to which they are willing to seek information 
about a case beyond what the parties have put before them, to base 
decisions on such information, and more generally to draw on background 
information and intuitions they bring with them to a case. 
Such potential differences in style hearken back to the distinction 
between the fox and the hedgehog. Dan Farber and Suzanna Sherry have 
made an analogous point in the context of gauging the effects of political 
ideology, arguing that current judicial selection processes  
diminish the likelihood of appointing foxes rather than hedgehogs. 
The stronger the commitment to a particular ideology, the less open 
a judge will be to other perspectives. Instead of focusing on 
 
 
 87. See supra Part I.B. 
 88. See supra note 61. 
 89. See infra Part III.D. 
 90. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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ideological commitment, then, presidents and senators should be 
looking for evidence of the dispositional traits that have been shown 
to enhance judgment and good decision making. We should be 
seeking an openness to other perspectives, a willingness to revise 
one’s views in the face of new information, and a refusal to adopt a 
single approach to decision-making.
91
  
It seems to be a plausible hypothesis that generalists will, on average, tend 
more toward the intellectual humility characteristic of foxes than will 
specialists, for the simple reason that one seems more likely to have 
embraced a big idea that will apply to a large number of cases if one 
operates within the narrow confines of a specialty than if one hears a 
variety of cases.
92
 But any such effect also seems likely to be context-
dependent. Within the context of a routine case, for example, the specialist 
might be willing to account for a greater range of information in her 
decision making, while the generalist would tend to base her decision on 
the factors expressly identified in the governing legal standard. In less-
routine cases, the effect may run in the opposite direction. In such cases it 
seems plausible that generalists will be more fox-like than specialists and 
more open to a broad array of information (at least in the sense that they 
will be relatively less likely than the specialist to have precommitted to a 
view of the subject matter or relevant subparts thereof). 
I want to emphasize that I do not mean to foreclose consideration of the 
possibility that the differences will break out in different ways, or even 
that there will be no differences at all. The point of the exercise is not to 
generate confident conclusions, but instead to articulate potential 
consequences of the choice between generalism and specialism that have 
been overlooked or glossed over in past discussions. The next two 
subparts represent an effort to continue the exploration by focusing on the 
dispute resolution and law declaration roles.  
 
 
 91. Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Building a Better Judiciary, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 291 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010). 
 92. “Specialized judges who are expert in the subject matter of their court’s work at the time they 
take their positions or who develop that expertise through constant work in one field tend to feel 
greater confidence in their judgment than their generalist counterparts. Because of this confidence, 
they are likely to be more assertive than generalists in their policy making.” BAUM, supra note 4, at 
35. 
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A. Generalist Judges and Dispute Resolution 
The argument for a generalist judiciary seems somewhat weaker within 
the context of the dispute resolution function. The judicial role in fulfilling 
this function is, of course, often limited. At the trial court level, judges 
occasionally serve as factfinders, but more often serve the dispute 
resolution function by narrowing the scope of the dispute presented to a 
jury through various rulings at and before trial. At the appellate level, the 
dispute resolution function (which is often, and in my view misleadingly, 
referred to as the error correction function) involves primarily the 
resolution of disputes over legal questions.
93
 
As noted above, assessment of whether a particular regime is “better” 
at dispute resolution requires agreement on the metric by which to assess 
quality, which leads quickly into contested territory.
94
 Even so, it seems 
safe to imagine that expert judges will generate better decisions at least in 
the sense that other experts will regard them as such. One might even 
provisionally accept that the decisions will be in some ultimate sense more 
just. Both phenomena seem likely to be products of specialists’ proclivity 
to assess a given situation by reference to a greater range of features than 
the generalist, or even doctrine, is likely to account for. The tax court 
judge, for example, may be able to appreciate the connections between 
pieces of a transaction in ways that a generalist cannot and, as a result, be 
led to rule on a dispute in a way and for reasons that are neither evident to 
the generalist nor clearly incorporated into the governing legal standard. 
At least in the short term, then, the increased accuracy in the two senses 
just identified may come at the expense of accuracy as measured by a 
formalist expectation that judicial decisions are to conform to rules of 
law.
95
 Generalist judges, in contrast, are more likely to dispense justice 
that is relatively rough and rule-based. The generalist will be 
comparatively (and perhaps even, in some cases, absolutely) unable to 
appreciate the nuance and complexity of the factual situation or legal 
framework, and thus more inclined to rely on previously articulated legal 
standards to guide resolution. There is some empirical support for the 
assertion that judges who are experts in a given subject matter will 
 
 
 93. See generally Oldfather, supra note 85. 
 94. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 95. To the extent that an expert judiciary updates the law to account for this greater range of 
factors, it will introduce a set of concerns addressed in the next part. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
872 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:847 
 
 
 
 
implement rules applicable to their decision making differently than their 
non-expert counterparts.
96
 
In this regard, it may be helpful to consider Karl Llewellyn’s 
distinction between “paper rules” and “real rules.”97 Paper rules are those 
included in the governing precedent or statutory text. Real rules are those 
that describe the actual manner in which official actors address the 
relevant category of behavior. Frederick Schauer illustrates the distinction 
by way of a simple example. In the case of a speed limit, the paper rule 
may be that vehicles may travel no faster than 65 miles per hour, while the 
real rule is that drivers will not be sanctioned unless they exceed 74 miles 
per hour.
98
 Such a real rule may be tethered to the paper rule to some 
degree, but must also be the product of something else, which likely 
includes “the regularities of craft, of acculturation, and of judges because 
of their craft often having a shared sense of the purpose of some area of 
law.”99 Those forces are apt to operate more strongly upon the specialist 
than the generalist. Thus, a court of specialized, expert judges seems more 
likely to develop real rules that depart from the paper rules generated by 
legislatures or higher generalist courts. Generalists, in contrast, will not be 
as subject to the influence of these other factors, and will thereby be more 
inclined to decide according to the paper rule. Note that this does not mean 
there will be greater regularity in the decisions of the generalist court or 
that its decisions will be more rule bound. If the “shared sense of purpose” 
and other determinants of the real rule are sufficiently strong, the decisions 
of the specialist court might well be more predictable (to the properly 
informed observer) than those of the generalist court. 
The difference can be characterized in yet another way. The difference 
between generalist and specialist judges echoes the differences between 
rules and standards.
100
 Generalist judges will consistently find themselves 
 
 
 96. For example, Deborah Merritt and James Brudney found that judges with practice experience 
relating to the NLRA published a lower portion of their opinions than those who did not (the 
publication decision being one governed by circuit rules). Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, 
Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 69, 114–15 (2001). This research, of course, concerns judges with specialized knowledge who 
serve on generalist courts, which is undoubtedly a significant contextual factor, and thus any 
extrapolation from that work to a more generic consideration of specialists versus generalists must be 
undertaken with caution. 
 97. See Frederick Schauer, Editor’s Introduction to KARL LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 
1, 11–12 (2011). 
 98. Id. at 20–21. 
 99. Id. at 24–25. 
 100. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 58 (1992) (contrasting rules with standards, which “tends to collapse decisionmaking back 
into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] JUDGING, EXPERTISE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 873 
 
 
 
 
adjudicating cases as to which they lack both an expert’s grasp of the 
situation and a firm sense of the background principles that ought to 
govern. They may thus be more inclined to rely on rules—in the form of 
relatively strict adherence to statutory language and precedent—where 
they are available. The specialist, in contrast, will be better situated to 
appreciate how this case differs from past cases, and to have a sense for 
whether those differences ought to be regarded as consequential in light of 
her understanding of the purposes of the law (even if, and perhaps 
particularly if, the differences in question are not accounted for under the 
articulated legal standards that govern the case). 
Yet even if one accepts the suggestion that a specialized judiciary will 
generate better results, at least in terms of the dispute resolution function, 
there are other factors to consider. Accuracy, however assessed, is not the 
only end of adjudication.
101
 There are process values that must be 
accounted for as well. In this regard, the specialized adjudicator will be 
less able to fulfill the role of the detached, reactive, neutral, “umpire” 
judge than her generalist counterpart. Because she possesses greater 
knowledge about the context in which the dispute arose and the governing 
legal framework, she is more likely to develop preconceptions regarding 
its proper resolution, and thus to be a more active participant in the 
litigation than what the canonical version of the adversary system calls 
for.
102
 Under some conceptions of the judicial role, this stepping out of the 
umpireal posture itself undercuts legitimacy.
103
 
One might also suggest that it is inappropriate to isolate dispute 
resolution in this way. That is, the exercise of the law declaration function 
(to which I will turn next) to some degree depends on the appropriate 
contemporaneous exercise of the dispute resolution function.
104
 If the facts 
of the dispute have not been adequately found—something that requires 
judicial input either as factfinder or as trial supervisor—then there will be 
an insufficient foundation based on which to use the case as a vehicle for 
making appropriate law. Usually this lack of foundation will not present a 
problem. The appellate court will create law on the assumption that the 
dispute as presented to it accurately reflects the underlying facts and 
dispute, and issue its ruling as if that were so. The concern would arise in 
 
 
 101. To take just one example, we also want a system in which litigants feel as though they were 
given a fair hearing. See Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science 
Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871 (1997).  
 102. For an outline of a version of the canonical, reactive judge, see Oldfather, supra note 82, at 
139–45. 
 103. Id. at 140 (describing Lon Fuller’s participation thesis). 
 104. See supra note 84. 
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situations where the underlying facts were systematically skewed by the 
trial-level judiciary (whether generalist or specialist) in a way that in turn 
leads to the skewing of the law. What could conceivably result is a body of 
law based on an inaccurate understanding of the way the world that it 
governs works. 
B. Generalist Judges and Law Declaration 
It seems reasonable to suspect that the law created by generalist and 
specialist judiciaries will differ along at least three dimensions: content, 
form, and stability. Of these, content is probably the easiest to appreciate. 
As developed above,
105
 the case for specialized courts proceeds to a 
considerable degree from the understanding that they will generate 
different, and in the proponent’s estimation better, law than generalist 
courts. Anticipated differences in content, then, are not merely a 
consequence but rather one of the aims of specialization. Beyond that, all 
that it seems possible, in the abstract, to say about the content of law 
generated by specialized courts is that it is likely to conform more closely 
to what experts in the field—or at least some subset of experts in the 
field—deem appropriate. 
One can engage in considerably more speculation about potential 
differences in form. Start with the proposition that judicial lawmaking as a 
process relies to a large degree on the finding of “legislative facts.” 
Legislative facts are not the facts of the immediate dispute before the court 
(the “adjudicative facts”), but rather the sorts of background 
understandings—of how the world works in general and in the specific 
type of situation before the court, how people and institutions respond to 
incentives, and so forth—that underlie conclusions about the content of the 
best rule of law for a specific situation.
106
 Members of specialized 
judiciary confronted with an opportunity to make law are likely to reach 
different conclusions about applicable legislative facts than would their 
generalist counterparts for reasons that track those affecting their 
respective factfinding abilities. As a group, such judges will have greater 
familiarity with the relevant subject area, and most likely greater expertise, 
and as a consequence are likely to have a different understanding of the 
background against which they are making law than would generalists. 
 
 
 105. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 106. The distinction between legislative and adjudicative fact-finding originated with Kenneth 
Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
364, 402 (1942). 
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Not only is the specialists’ understanding likely to differ with regard to its 
content, it is also likely to be qualitatively different in a sense independent 
of content. The most likely difference will be in its particularity. The 
specialist is likely to regard more of the features of the factual landscape 
surrounding a given dispute as constituting appropriate inputs for reaching 
a “just” resolution of that dispute. This, in turn, will have the likely result 
of making the legal rules generated by specialist judiciaries less 
categorical. Put differently, just as there may be echoes of the distinction 
between rules and standards when it comes to dispute resolution,
107
 so 
might specialized courts create more standards and fewer rules than would 
the generalist judiciary (and if they do not, there may be greater variance 
between the paper rules and the real rules because of the play of expertise 
in the context of adjudicative factfinding). 
Some recent Supreme Court cases may illustrate this dynamic. One 
frequent criticism of the Court in recent years is that, because of the 
justices’ backgrounds, they lack an appropriately nuanced understanding 
of what takes place at the trial level (or perhaps more generally of how the 
law operates “on the ground”).108 As a result, this critique continues, the 
Court is prone to generating decisions that articulate bright-line rules that 
prove to be unworkable in practice. The treatment of the interaction 
between hearsay and the Confrontation Clause in the Court’s opinion in 
Crawford v. Washington
109
 provides one example. In Crawford, the Court, 
in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, adopted a seemingly bright-line 
test that turns on the “testimonial” nature of a hearsay statement.110 A 
number of commentators reacted to the case by noting the practical 
difficulties it would create.
111
 Subsequent opinions suggested that the line 
was nowhere near as bright as it first appeared.
112
 And the Court’s recent 
decision in Michigan v. Bryant,
113
 in which a majority of the Court 
 
 
 107. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 108. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombley to Iqbal, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 86–87 
(2010) (“The Justices do not have the time, trial-court experience, or on-the-ground information to 
evaluate the consequences that procedural changes may have on private enforcement of substantive 
law or what alternative enforcement mechanisms should be established if litigation pathways are 
impaired.”); Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Iqbal, Twombley, and the Lessons of the Celotex Trilogy, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 143, 156 (2010) (“[W]e should be wary of drawing the conclusions that some have that 
the Supreme Court does not understand trial court practice, or that we would be better off if there were 
more Justices with trial court experience.”). 
 109. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 110. 541 U.S. at 53. 
 111. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005). 
 112. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 
813 (2006). 
 113. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
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concluded that a gunshot victim’s statements to police concerning the 
identity of the shooter were nontestimonial, prompted a dissenting Justice 
Scalia to characterize the Court as “the obfuscator of last resort.”114 Part of 
the point I am striving to make here is akin to Dan Farber’s case against 
certain types of legal scholarship.
115
 Farber’s suggestion was that law itself 
is not (or at least ought not to be) “brilliant” in the sense that it is 
susceptible to unconventional, paradigm-shifting insights for the simple 
reason that law values predictability and stability, and thus is inherently 
incompatible with brilliance.
116
 The point does not transfer completely, as 
brilliant legal scholarship of the sort Farber targeted tends to be more 
startling and novel than most judicial decisions, even the innovative ones. 
But I have a sense—which conversations with my IP colleagues regarding 
the Federal Circuit seem to confirm—that specialist judges will be more 
inclined to strive for something like brilliance and innovation than 
generalists.
117
 
One might also hypothesize that generalist judges will—again, on 
average—generate law that is more understandable than will specialists. In 
part, this is a function of capacity. If a generalist judge lacks the ability to 
appreciate the intricacies of a situation in the way that an expert can, then 
he will likewise be unable to account for that intricacy in the law that he 
creates. On the other side, the specialist will often succumb to the 
tendencies toward jargon and “inside baseball” that seem to afflict experts 
of every stripe. Such judges, after all, will be writing largely for 
specialized audiences, and thus may feel less need to write their decisions 
in a manner that a lay audience can understand.  
In a related vein, some have argued that the law created by generalist 
judges is likely to be more stable than that created by specialized courts. 
Judge Posner suggests that divisions in ethical, political, and economic 
thought among specialists would be more likely to lead to volatility in law. 
This volatility could occur in two ways: through the operation of internal 
court dynamics, or via external pressures. First, there is the likelihood that 
 
 
 114. 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]oday’s opinion distorts our Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence and leaves it in a shambles. Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself 
the obfuscator of last resort.”). 
 115. Daniel A. Farber, Commentary, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986). 
 116. Id. at 924–29. 
 117. But there is a counterpoint here. If, as I have suggested, generalists will be more likely to 
engage in formalist reasoning, then they can be led astray in a different way. Farber speaks to this, too. 
“Lawyers are more impressed by experience than by logic in part because they know perfectly well 
that any chain of argument has a weak link. . . . [T]he sheer force of a complicated logical argument 
will (and should) persuade people to adopt conclusions they regard as ridiculous.” Daniel A. Farber, 
Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367, 373 (1987). 
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“experts are more sensitive to the swings in professional opinion than an 
outsider, a generalist, would be.”118 Not only are experts perhaps more 
susceptible to faddishness than generalists at the individual level, but there 
is arguably also a greater potential for any given trend to take hold within 
a specialized judiciary. This is function of both size and geography. 
Specialized courts are likely to be smaller and more geographically 
concentrated than generalist courts, both of which are factors that may 
make it easier for a single way of thinking to take hold over an entire 
court.
119
 The monopolization of viewpoint is, in turn, likely to create a 
tendency for courts to make more questions legal. Put differently, a 
specialized court seems more likely to allocate the power to decide certain 
issues to itself rather than to juries.
120
 Second, specialized courts are likely 
to be more susceptible to external pressures.
121
 A smaller portion of the 
citizenry is likely to be interested in such a court, meaning that a relatively 
small number of interest groups are likely to play a significant role in the 
selection process. In addition, a specialized court presents an easier target 
for the political branches. On the whole, then, a generalist judiciary seems 
likely to be more independent (and less accountable, in at least some 
senses of judicial accountability) than a specialized court. This is not to 
suggest that generalist courts are immune from the sorts of external 
pressures that generate volatility. As Peggy Davis’ study of courts’ use of 
psychological parent theory revealed, generalist judges and courts are 
often too willing to accept theories from other disciplines without 
sufficiently careful consideration.
122
  
As the discussion in the preceding paragraph suggests, the presence of 
specialized courts seems to create greater potential for balkanization. This 
can occur in two ways. The first comes with respect to the resolution of 
problems common to both specialized and generalist courts, such as those 
relating to procedure. As specialist courts develop their own culture, there 
is an increasing chance that they will resolve these common questions in a 
 
 
 118. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 781. 
 119. Id. at 786. 
 120. This sort of phenomenon, though not in the context of specialized courts, is described in 
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957). 
 121. See Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 9, at 379–80; Jordan, supra note 9, at 
748; Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive, supra note 9, at 783. 
 122. Davis, supra note 43, at 1593. “[T]he uses uncovered by this study were often incautious. 
Courts have frequently accepted the theory on the basis of one-sided presentations, rendering case-
specific results of its acceptance questionable. Developments in the law based upon psychological 
parent theories have been far reaching, yet they too have resulted from one-sided deliberations.” Id. 
(footnotes omitted). There might be a tie-in here to a larger point about the tension (or perhaps even 
incompatibility) between law and science. 
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materially different manner than their generalist counterparts. Although 
there will almost always be a generalist court at the top of the judicial 
pyramid with responsibility for policing uniformity, it is unrealistic to 
assume that such a court will be able to monitor the courts underneath it 
closely enough to ensure full uniformity. Indeed, it may be that the court 
of discretionary jurisdiction will tend to defer to the specialized court.
123
 
The second is more dramatic. Over the long term, one might expect to see 
at least some specialized bodies of law continue a path of separate 
development to such an extent that they become not merely different legal 
dialects, but completely distinct languages. 
It bears mention again that the analysis in this subpart is necessarily 
speculative and provisional. It represents an effort to anticipate ways in 
which the processes and outputs of specialist and generalist judiciaries 
might differ, and suggestions as to what the content of those differences 
might be. The point is primarily to identify the considerable work that 
remains in order for us to understand the tradeoffs involved in any move 
toward specialization. A considerable amount of both theoretical and 
empirical exploration will be necessary to our understanding. The next 
Part, which draws on psychological research on expertise, serves as an 
example of one type of analysis and investigation that remains. 
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPERTISE 
As the preceding discussion revealed, the existing literature on judicial 
specialization generally fails to grapple in depth with the nature of the 
expertise that specialized judges or courts might possess. As it happens, 
psychologists have conducted a considerable amount of research into the 
nature of expertise, and this part explores the implications of that work for 
judicial specialization. As the discussion will reveal, the psychology of 
expertise remains a field in development, such that one must resist the 
temptation to draw firm conclusions from it. This is doubly so because 
none of the work has focused on judging, and very little of it has addressed 
the possibility or parameters of decision-making expertise. As a result, the 
discussion that follows will serve not as the basis for broad prescriptive 
claims, but rather as a source for critical assessment of prior assertions 
about the nature of judicial expertise, the identification of factors relevant 
to the design of specialized courts, and facilitating the generation of 
informed hypotheses that might be tested in future work. 
 
 
 123. This was, at least initially, the Supreme Court’s stance vis-à-vis the Federal Circuit and 
patent law. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 42–43 (2010). 
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A. Defining the Concept of “Expertise” 
There are at least two approaches one can take to defining the concept 
of expertise. The first, which I will call the relative approach, conceives of 
expertise in terms of relative knowledge levels.
124
 On this view, an expert 
is simply someone who knows more about the topic at hand, and expertise 
is a relative rather than an absolute characteristic. Thus, for example, in 
any group there will be individuals recognized as the best people to 
consult in order to solve a specific problem, whether it is the best place to 
order a pizza from or how to interpret an x-ray.
125
 Whenever someone is in 
position to provide useful information to another, that person counts as an 
expert relative to the person seeking the information. The implications of 
this approach extend beyond such situational happenstance and into what 
are typically regarded as fields of expertise. One such implication is that 
status as an expert is not limited only to those fortunate enough to have 
some necessary combination of talent and drive, but is also open to 
novices who devote the time necessary to acquire the requisite 
knowledge.
126
 
A second approach to expertise, which I will call the qualitative 
approach, regards it as involving the crossing of a qualitative threshold. 
This approach presupposes that there is a phenomenon—“expertise”—that 
exists apart from mere knowledge of a subject matter. One of the premises 
underlying this vein of research exploring expertise is that there are 
psychological similarities amongst different kinds of experts, ranging from 
elite athletes to the proverbial rocket scientists and brain surgeons, which 
can be isolated and assessed.
127
 On this view, expertise exists as a 
characteristic that is distinct from both generalized talent or intelligence 
and a long tenure of experience in a given subject matter. As one 
psychologist put the matter, “[e]xperts certainly know more, but they also 
 
 
 124. HARALD A. MIEG, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF EXPERTISE: CASE STUDIES IN RESEARCH, 
PROFESSIONAL DOMAINS, AND EXPERT ROLES 2–9 (2001). 
 125. On this view, anyone can end up in a situation in which they will function as an expert. 
“[T]he interaction involved in consulting an expert or, respectively, being consulted as an expert is 
based on a simple fact: There is somebody who seems to have knowledge that someone else is in need 
of.” Id. at 43. 
 126. Michelene T. H. Chi, Two Approaches to the Study of Experts’ Characteristics, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 23 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. 
eds., 2006).  
 127. See K. Anders Ericsson, An Introduction to Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance: Its Development, Organization, and Content, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 3, 9 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006). 
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know differently.”128 Note that, in addition to the divide between the two 
approaches, there is also the potential for a divide over whether these 
approaches can coexist. One might regard both conceptions of expertise as 
legitimate, or one might deny either the status of relative experts as true 
experts or the existence of experts who possess qualitatively superior 
expertise. 
While this second approach regards expertise as distinct from subject-
matter knowledge, the concepts nonetheless remain connected. As the idea 
is typically phrased, expertise is domain-specific.
129
 Contrary to the 
common perception that expertise is merely the product of some general 
underlying talent, research reveals that basic measures of intelligence do 
not do well as predictors of the development of expertise in a given 
domain.
130
 Just as Michael Jordan’s talents on the basketball court did not 
carry over to the baseball diamond, so, too, might the elite philosopher 
make only an average lawyer, and vice versa.
131
 Thus, the difference 
between experts and novices reflects not merely the presence of similar 
skills in greater amounts, but also the possession of different (though 
surely overlapping) skill sets the expert acquired along his lengthy journey 
to that status. 
The nature of that journey is a significant factor. It is not enough, in 
order to become the sort of expert who “knows differently,” simply to 
accumulate experience within a domain. Doing so will, to be sure, lead to 
improved skills, as common experience suggests that almost anything 
becomes easier upon repetition. But for most people, the accrual of 
experience leads to a plateau of acceptable performance beyond which 
 
 
 128. Paul J. Feltovich et al., Studies of Expertise from Psychological Perspectives, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 41, 57 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. 
eds., 2006). 
 129. This is a consistent theme of the literature. Id. at 47 (“There is little transfer from high-level 
proficiency in one domain to proficiency in other domains—even when the domains seem, intuitively, 
very similar.”). Domain-specificity necessarily applies in the context of relative expertise as well. My 
being well situated to tell others where to order a pizza does not mean that I will be able to provide 
similar guidance with respect to sushi, or that I would be properly regarded as the pizza expert in a 
different context. 
 130. See id.; see also Ericsson, supra note 127, at 10. 
 131. This is not to deny the existence of the occasional Bo Jackson or Deion Sanders (both were 
dual-sport athletes), but only to assert that they are rare.  
There is a general belief that talented people display superior performance in a wide range of 
activities, such as having superior athletic ability and superior mental abilities. However, if 
we restrict the claims to individuals who can perform at very high levels in a domain, then it 
is clear that people hardly ever reach an elite level in more than a single domain of 
activity. . . . There is little transfer from high-level proficiency in one domain to proficiency 
in other domains—even when the domains seem, intuitively, very similar. 
Feltovich et al., supra note 128, at 47. 
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additional experience does not result in improvement.
132
 At that point, 
performance is likely to remain constant, or even decrease, with 
subsequent experience unless the aspiring expert engages in deliberate 
efforts to improve performance.
133
 Further improvement requires a 
program of deliberate, structured practice, in which participants focus on 
systematically identifying and eliminating shortcomings, and obtain 
feedback that allows them to refine their performance.
134
 Research 
suggests that, as a general matter, ten years of experience involving this 
sustained devotion to improvement is required to reach the highest levels 
in a domain.
135
 On this conception, expertise stands as something of an 
absolute and the category of experts includes only truly exceptional 
individuals within a given area.
136
 
None of the above discussion is to suggest that innate talent or 
intelligence is irrelevant. Two relevant subcomponents of general 
intelligence are fluid intelligence—reasoning ability in its general form—
and crystallized intelligence, which concerns “the possession and use of 
knowledge to solve problems.”137 Domains will differ in the extent to 
which fluid intelligence is utilized in the exercise of expertise. For some 
skills, such as the repetitive motions involved in swinging a golf club or 
shooting a basketball, fluid intelligence comes into play only at the 
learning stage.
138
 Others, “such as the analogical reasoning typical of the 
law, involve varied mappings, the development of mental models of a 
situation, and extensive knowledge.”139 For these skills, fluid intelligence 
 
 
 132. Ericsson, supra note 127, at 13. “The path to expertise is not fully monotonic. Plateaus are 
reached at which the person is comfortable and confident. But it’s necessary to move off such plateaus 
to advance. This involves some discomfort and considerable effort. It may involve unlearning some 
aspects of what brought one to a comfort-level of expertise.” John Horn & Hiromi Masunaga, A 
Merging Theory of Expertise and Intelligence, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND 
EXPERT PERFORMANCE 587, 601 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006). 
 133. Feltovich et al., supra note 128, at 60. 
 134. See Horn & Masunaga, supra note 132, at 601; see also K. Anders Ericsson, The Influence of 
Experience and Deliberate Practice on the Development of Superior Expert Performance, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 683, 692–94 (K. Anders Ericsson 
et al. eds., 2006). 
 135. Id. at 689. 
 136. See Chi, supra note 126, at 22. Under this definition of expertise, some of the understandings 
outlined in the preceding paragraphs need to be qualified, for “there is a tacit assumption in the 
literature that perhaps these individuals somehow have greater minds in the sense that the ‘global 
qualities of their thinking’ might be different. For example, they might utilize more powerful domain-
general heuristics that novices are not aware of, or they may be naturally endowed with greater 
memory capacity.” Id.  
 137. Earl Hunt, Expertise, Talent, and Social Encouragement, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 31, 32 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 2006). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 32–33. 
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remains important, and the development of expertise involves not pure 
automation of the relevant conduct, but rather “requires the development 
of schema that can guide problem solving. To some extent the use of such 
schema can reduce the burden on working memory, thus shifting the 
balance between” fluid and crystallized intelligence.140  
It is one thing to say what expertise is, and another to identify those 
who qualify as experts. Of course, under a view of expertise as merely 
involving the possession of relatively more knowledge, the task requires 
nothing more than a contextual assessment of comparative knowledge 
levels. But if one takes a qualitative approach, the task can become more 
difficult, depending on the nature of the underlying domain. Some provide 
objective criteria. Sports are perhaps the most obvious example, but the 
dynamic exists in any domain in which it is possible to demonstrate 
consistently superior performance, such that the novice observer can 
appreciate the presence of expertise.
141
 But few fields of human endeavor 
are susceptible to such easy assessment. In other domains, “it is difficult 
for non-experts to identify experts, and consequently researchers rely on 
peer-nominations by professionals in the same domain.”142 
B. The Mechanisms and Effects of Expertise 
Unsurprisingly, perspectives on the mechanisms through which 
expertise manifests itself depend on which approach to defining expertise 
one takes. Under a relative approach, the thought processes of experts 
differ from novices only in degree. The expert has a greater store of 
knowledge to draw on, and perhaps has structured the knowledge in a 
more effective way.
143
 Novices may need to devote more of their attention 
to the rules of a game or other basic information. In time, however, that 
information becomes internalized and automatically accessible, enabling 
cognitive resources to be focused elsewhere.
144
 Beyond that, however, the 
manner in which information is retrieved, processed, and implemented is 
the same as is true for novices. For those who regard expertise as existing 
only in a relative form, efficiency is the sole reason for bringing expertise 
to bear on a problem. As Harald Mieg puts the point, “[t]he core of the 
expert’s role consists of providing experience-based knowledge that we 
 
 
 140. Id. at 33. 
 141. Ericsson, supra note 127, at 3. 
 142. Id. at 4. 
 143. Chi, supra note 126, at 22. 
 144. MIEG, supra note 124, at 21–22 (describing the transformation from “declarative 
knowledge”—knowledge about what—to “procedural knowledge”—knowledge about how). 
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could attain ourselves if we had enough time to make the necessary 
experience.”145  
Research conducted under the qualitative approach, in contrast, 
suggests that experts go about their tasks in a manner that is qualitatively 
different from novices. In part, this may be because they do, in fact, “think 
differently” from novices. “For example, they might utilize more powerful 
domain-general heuristics that novices are not aware of, or they may be 
naturally endowed with greater memory capacity.”146 The differences are 
also attributable to the different knowledge structures developed by 
experts.
147
 To simplify, novices tend to see trees, while experts see forests. 
Relative to novices, experts organize information into units that are larger 
in scope, deeper in reach, and conceptually more abstract.
148
 Presented 
with a problem, experts are able to see more features, and better appreciate 
its “deep structure,” than are novices.149 This places experts in a better 
position to access, assess, and implement their accumulated knowledge in 
a manner appropriate to the situation presented.
150
 Research suggests, for 
example, that expert and novice chess players looking at the same 
chessboard see different things.
151
 The novice sees a collection of pieces, 
while the expert sees a collection of relationships among pieces. 
The expert’s ability to peer more deeply into problems can be both a 
blessing and a curse. As a general matter, experts are more able than 
novices to engage in metacognition—reflecting on, and critically 
assessing, the nature of their own thinking about a problem or situation—
which in turn puts them in a better position to recognize when what they 
face is nonroutine and to make adjustments in response.
152
 Even within an 
expert’s home domain, however, there lies the potential for 
 
 
 145. MIEG, supra note 124, at 43. 
 146. Chi, supra note 126, at 22. 
 147. “Expertise is appropriately viewed not as a simple (and often short-term) matter of fact or 
skill acquisition, but rather as a complex construct of adaptations of mind and body, which include 
substantial self-monitoring and control mechanisms, to task environments in service of representative 
task goals and activities.” Feltovich et al., supra note 128, at 57. 
 148. See Feltovich et al., supra note 128, at 50–53. “Human information processing is limited to 
seven chunks at a time. By chunking, human experts—in chess and other domains—are able to reduce 
domain-specific information complexity. This ability is based on the perception of domain-specific 
meaningful patterns. In other words, experts see constellations.” MIEG, supra note 124, at 20 
(emphasis in original). 
 149. Chi, supra note 126, at 23. 
 150. Feltovich et al., supra note 128, at 54–55. 
 151. J. FRANK YATES, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 373 (1990). 
 152. See id.; Chi, supra note 126, at 24 (“Experts have more accurate self-monitoring skills in 
terms of their ability to detect errors and the status of their own comprehension.”). 
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overconfidence and the tendency to overlook the details of a situation.
153
 
Moreover, the scale of experts’ knowledge structures can sometimes 
inhibit their ability to appreciate when the deep structure of a problem 
differs from what is typical in the domain, which might in turn limit their 
ability to fashion non-standard solutions.
154
 
Those limitations aside, experts tend to produce superior results for 
many kinds of tasks. “Experts excel in generating the best solution, such 
as the best move in chess, even under time constraints, or the best solution 
in solving problems, or the best design in designing a task.”155 Part of this 
may be a function of experts’ ability to avoid falling prey to the sorts of 
cognitive biases that skew much human thought away from the ideal of 
rationality.
156
 
C. Expertise and Creativity 
The relationship between expertise and creativity remains murky, with 
competing strands of research articulating contrasting—though perhaps 
ultimately compatible—perspectives. One view holds that expertise 
fosters, and indeed is necessary for, creativity.
157
 From this perspective the 
primary driver of creative thought is the possession of a comprehensive 
knowledge of the relevant domain, which allows the actor to generate 
novel solutions to problems based on a full appreciation of the key 
components of that situation and the larger context in which it arises.
158
 
What appears to the outside observer to be a creative “leap” involves 
instead the expert appreciating the connections between the various 
components of her knowledge base. The advanced chess player, able to 
appreciate the position of the pieces on the board at a greater level of 
abstraction than the novice, will naturally be able to see effective moves 
that the novice will be unable to anticipate and may even perceive as 
counterintuitive. In similar fashion, an advanced engineer will be 
 
 
 153. Id. at 25. 
 154. Id. at 26–27. 
 155. Id. at 23. 
 156. Karol G. Ross et al., Professional Judgments and “Naturalistic Decision Making,” in THE 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 403, 405 (K. Anders Ericsson et 
al. eds., 2006) (“Many studies have found that when experts perform in their domain in their natural 
context, bias is alleviated and experts yield good judgments.”). 
 157. For an overview, see Robert W. Weisberg, Expertise and Reason in Creative Thinking, in 
CREATIVITY AND REASON IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 7 (James C. Kaufman & John Baer eds., 
2006). 
 158. Id. at 38 (“The creative thinker, no different from the noncreative thinker, uses his or her 
knowledge to deal with the situations he or she faces. The main difference between creative versus 
noncreative thinkers is the knowledge they bring to a situation within their area of expertise.”). 
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relatively more able than a novice to connect seemingly distinct strands of 
knowledge to solve a problem. 
The second view regards expertise and the logical application of expert 
knowledge as hindrances to creative thought.
159
 For example, Dean Keith 
Simonton suggests that while a baseline amount of domain-specific 
expertise is necessary for creativity, formal training that extends beyond 
that level can have a negative effect.
160
 From this perspective, the expert 
stands as too much of an insider, someone whose thought patterns will be 
filled with preconceived notions arising out of the received wisdom. The 
relative novice, in contrast, is not shackled by dominant approaches, and is 
therefore more likely to be open to considering, and giving effect to, new 
ways of thinking about problems. Indeed, Simonton asserts that creativity 
is fostered not by intense focus on a single domain, but rather through 
exposure to, and work in, different genres and methodologies. “These 
effects are analogous to overtraining and crosstraining in sports. Creativity 
is nurtured by crosstraining and hindered by overtraining. It is more 
crucial for knowledge to be broad than deep.”161 
D. Decision-making Expertise 
As Frank Yates and Michael Tschirhart point out, researchers and 
laypeople alike tend to assume that those with subject-matter expertise 
will consequently make superior decisions within their domain of 
expertise.
162
 There is undoubtedly a necessary connection between the 
two, in that one cannot effectively make decisions within a domain 
without at least some baseline level of substantive knowledge.
163
 Yet, they 
argue, “[e]quating decision-making and subject-matter expertise 
effectively assumes that there is no such thing as decision-making 
expertise per se.”164 On this view, decision-making constitutes a subset of 
the larger phenomenon of problem solving, with a “decision” defined as “a 
 
 
 159. See generally Dean Keith Simonton, Creative Genius, Knowledge, and Reason, in 
CREATIVITY AND REASON IN COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT 43 (James C. Kaufman & John Baer eds., 
2006). 
 160. Id. at 45. 
 161. Id. at 48. 
 162. J. Frank Yates & Michael D. Tschirhart, Decision-Making Expertise, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF EXPERTISE AND EXPERT PERFORMANCE 421, 426 (K. Anders Ericsson et al. eds., 
2006). 
 163. “For instance, it would be impossible for a layperson who knows nothing about the law to 
consistently make decent legal decisions on behalf of clients.” Id. 
 164. Id. 
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commitment to a course of action that is intended to yield results that are 
satisfying for specified individuals.”165 
Research exploring the possibility of decision-making expertise is 
underdeveloped, and is hampered in part by the difficulty involved in 
measuring the quality of a decision. One perspective focuses simply on the 
results produced by decisions.
166
 Another focuses more on process, on the 
theory that decisions are made in the face of uncertainty, such that their 
consequences can be affected by events that cannot be anticipated or 
controlled.
167
 This latter view recognizes that even what counts as the best 
possible decision, given the information known at the time, could turn out 
to have bad results. There is, of course, a further complication in that 
observers will often disagree about the relative desirability of decisional 
outcomes, whether actual or anticipated.
168
 Yates and Tschirhart suggest 
that the “implicit subjectivity” of decision problems “represents a 
significant and challenging departure from most expertise scholarship, 
which prizes unambiguous performance criteria.”169 This, coupled with the 
likely operation of cognitive biases in the process of determining who 
counts as an expert,
170
 leads them to conclude that “our assumptions about 
who is or is not a decision-making expert might not be as good as we 
hope.”171 
In an effort to advance the inquiry, Yates and Tschirhart outline what 
they call the “process-decomposition perspective,” in which they break the 
process of making a decision into its components. Their underlying 
assumption is that “[i]f each element is executed well, this should 
 
 
 165. Id. at 422.  
There are several major decision varieties: ‘choices,’ which entail the selection of a subset 
from a larger collection of discrete alternatives (e.g., a class of ten new graduate students 
from a pool of 100 applicants); ‘acceptances/rejections,’ which are special cases of choices in 
which only one specific option (e.g., potential marriage partner) is acknowledged and must be 
accepted or not; ‘evaluations,’ which are statements of worth that are backed up by 
commitments to act (e.g., a $310,000 binding bid on a house); and ‘constructions,’ which are 
attempts to create ideal decision problem solutions given available resources (e.g., a 
department’s budget or plan for fighting a fire). 
Id. 
 166. Id. at 423–24. 
 167. Id. at 424. 
 168. “The specification of beneficiaries [of a decision] is critical, implicating what is arguably the 
single feature of decision problems that distinguishes them more sharply from more general 
problems—differences among people in the values they attached to decision results.” Id. at 423 
(emphasis in original). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 425. 
 171. Id. at 426. 
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contribute significantly to the adequacy of the resulting decision.”172 They 
identify ten “cardinal issues” that “arise repeatedly in real-life decision 
problems.”173 Several of these appear to play an especially significant role 
in judicial decision-making. The “options” element concerns the decider’s 
ability to recognize the alternatives available.
174
 The goal is not simply to 
maximize the number of options under consideration, but to achieve an 
optimum balance of quantity and quality. Here they recognize a 
connection with the research on creativity “since, by definition, highly 
creative individuals are especially good at crafting new and useful 
alternatives.”175 Another element—the “possibilities” element—concerns 
the ability to anticipate the outcomes that might follow from various 
courses of action.
176
  
Having identified the options and recognized the possibilities, a 
decision maker must make a prediction concerning the most likely result 
associated with choosing an option. This, Yates and Tschirhart refer to as 
“judgment”—“an opinion as to what was, is, or will be the state of some 
decision-relevant aspect of the world.”177 They note that this aspect of 
decision-making has been addressed by more previous work than any 
other element they identify.
178
 “And the most consistent expertise 
conclusion has been this: Subject matter experts often exhibit much worse 
judgment accuracy than most people expect.”179 Yates attributes this in 
part to the existence of two fundamental types of judgment processes. The 
first, “formalistic procedures,” “are similar to the application of rules such 
as those in probability theory or regression analysis.”180 The second, which 
he calls “substantive procedures,” “entail the person attempting to 
envision how ‘nature’ literally would (or would not) create the event in 
 
 
 172. Id. at 426–27.  
 173. The issues are: “(1) need, (2) mode, (3) investment, (4) options, (5) possibilities, (6) 
judgment, (7) value, (8) tradeoffs, (9) acceptability, and (10) implementation.” Id. at 427. 
 174. Id. at 431. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Yates and Tschirhart explain that: 
Clearly, a truly expert decider would be good at anticipating possibilities. Yet, the 
possibilities issue as such has gone largely untouched in decision research. Nevertheless, 
work framed in other ways arguably has implications for it. This includes research 
demonstrating people’s difficulty even imagining the sometimes bizarre behaviors of 
common real-life non-linear systems. 
Id. at 432. 
 177. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 180. Id. at 433.  
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question.”181 While substantive reasoning can be quite powerful, its nature 
encourages overconfidence and error. 
To a considerable degree, phenomena affecting decision-making 
expertise track those concerning expertise more generally. Expert decision 
makers take more features of a situation into account, and represent that 
information to themselves in a different way, than novices do.
182
 As 
experience within a domain increases, decision makers organize the 
features of a situation into chunks that are increasingly large and 
increasingly linked.
183
 Although here, too, the line dividing those with 
expertise from those who are merely experienced is unclear, research 
suggests that “[e]xperts make distinctions that novices or experienced 
nonexperts ignore.”184 “Also, novices’ representations of alternatives will 
remain closely tied to the information that is explicitly presented. . . . In 
contrast, the representations that eventually develop in experts’ minds will 
be in terms of higher-level, more abstract principles or concepts. . . .”185 
Finally, expert decision makers will be faster, reaching a stage at which 
“the task changes to one of classification rather than true 
decisionmaking.”186 
E. Expert Political Judgment 
A final body of research that bears consideration is Philip Tetlock’s 
work on expert political judgment.
187
 Tetlock’s project was, in effect, to 
attempt to isolate the components of “good political judgment,” and he did 
so primarily by getting experts to make predictions about future states of 
the world and then, over time, assessing whether those predictions came 
true. The entire undertaking is, as he readily acknowledges, a slippery 
task, in large part because disagreements turn on more than ascertainable 
factual claims. Instead, they involve “hard-to-refute counterfactual claims 
about what would have happened if we had taken different policy paths 
and on impossible-to-refute moral claims about the types of people we 
should aspire to be—all claims that partisans can use to fortify their 
positions against falsification.”188 While Tetlock acknowledges the 
 
 
 181. Id. 
 182. See YATES, supra note 151, at 372–73. 
 183. Id. at 373. 
 184. Id. at 374. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 375. 
 187. See generally PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2005). 
 188. Id. at 4. 
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impossibility of eradicating all the subjectivity from the inquiry, he 
maintains that it is possible to assess them by reference both to the 
correspondence between experts’ predictions and reality and to the 
coherence of the processes by which they approach the task.
189
 
Tetlock concluded that, overall, experts’ judgment was not good. As he 
puts it, “[h]umanity barely bests the chimp.”190 “[V]ariation in forecasting 
skill is roughly normally distributed, with means hovering not much above 
chance and slightly below case-specific extrapolation algorithms.”191 
Tetlock found that demographic and life-history factors bore very little 
relationship to forecasting success. “It made virtually no difference 
whether participants had doctorates, whether they were economists, 
political scientists, journalists, or historians, whether they had policy 
experience or access to classified information, or whether they had logged 
many or few years of experience in their chosen line of work.”192 Nor did 
ideology or other factors relating to worldview or disposition correlate 
with forecasting success.
193
 
What did matter, Tetlock found, was the process by which experts 
approached the predictive task. Drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s famous fox-
hedgehog distinction,
194
 he found a “dimension [that] did what none of the 
measures of professional background could do: distinguish observers of 
the contemporary scene with superior forecasting records, across regions, 
topics, and time.”195 
Low scorers look like hedgehogs: thinkers who ‘know one big 
thing,’ aggressively extend the explanatory reach of that one big 
thing into new domains, display bristly impatience with those who 
‘do not get it,’ and express considerable confidence that they are 
already pretty proficient forecasters, at least in the long term. High 
scorers look like foxes: thinkers who know many small things 
(tricks of their trade), are skeptical of grand schemes, see 
 
 
 189. Id. at 6–7. Tetlock’s tests echo the results- and process-oriented approaches discussed by 
Yates and Tschirhart. See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text. 
 190. Id. at 51. 
 191. Id. at 65. 
 192. Id. at 68. 
 193. Id. at 71–72. He considered not only experts’ distribution along the traditional left-right 
spectrum, but also institutionalists (those inclined toward faith in international institutions) and realists 
(who were disinclined to subordinate national interests to international institutions), and doomsters 
(who regard ecosystems as fragile and have a generally pessimistic view of humanity’s ability to avoid 
a downward trajectory) and boomsters (who believe in the tendency of ecosystems to rebound and 
human ingenuity to resolve crises). Id. 
 194. See supra note 65. 
 195. Id. at 75. 
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explanation and prediction not as deductive exercises but rather as 
exercises in flexible ‘ad hocery’ that require stitching together 
diverse sources of information, and are rather diffident about their 
own forecasting prowess, and . . . rather dubious that the cloudlike 
subject of politics can be the object of clocklike science.
196
 
Looking beyond the simple fox-hedgehog divide, Tetlock found that 
“hedgehog extremists making long-term predictions in their domains of 
expertise” were the worst performers.197 The best were “foxes making 
short-term predictions within their domains of expertise.”198 In all, he 
concludes that “the performance gap between foxes and hedgehogs . . . is 
statistically reliable, but the size of the gap is moderated by at least three 
other variables: extremism, expertise, and forecasting horizon.”199 
Tetlock reasons that these results are consistent with other research on 
cognition. Hedgehogs, he suggests, “bear a strong family resemblance to 
high scorers on personality scales designed to measure needs for closure 
and structure—the type of people who have been shown in experimental 
research to be more likely to trivialize evidence that undercuts their 
preconceptions and to embrace evidence that reinforces their 
preconceptions.”200 Hedgehog experts perform especially poorly because 
their expertise better equips them to discount contrary evidence as well as 
to characterize evidence as bolstering their beliefs. Extremism magnifies 
the effect.
201
 Meanwhile, foxes are more self-critical and more inclined to 
anticipate criticism from others, and consequently more likely to give due 
consideration to all information that bears on their position.
202
 For foxes, 
expertise pays dividends, since it enhances their ability to assess all 
information. In all, Tetlock’s use of both quantitative and qualitative 
methods led him to conclude that “[f]oxes have better judgment than 
 
 
 196. Id. at 73–75. 
 197. Id. at 80. 
 198. Id. The quotes referenced in this and the preceding footnote occur in the context of Tetlock’s 
discussion of his calibration measure. His discussion of his discrimination measure reveals a similar 
dynamic. 
 199. Id. at 81. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Tetlock explains: 
[T]he combination of a hedgehog style and extreme convictions should be a particularly 
potent driver of confidence, with the greatest potential to impair calibration and 
discrimination when forecasters possess sufficient expertise to generate sophisticated 
justifications (fueling confidence) and when forecasters make longer-range predictions 
(pushing potentially embarrassing reality checks on over-confidence into the distant future). 
Id. at 82. 
 202. Id. at 82. 
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hedgehogs.”203 Foxes are not great at it, falling well short of statistical 
forecasting models, but they do manage to avoid the big mistakes that 
afflict hedgehogs. Foxes’ success, he concludes, arises out of their “more 
balanced style of thinking about the world—a style of thought that 
elevates no thought above criticism.”204 
IV. JUDGING, EXPERTISE, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The scope of our legal system, and thus of the matters that courts must 
adjudicate, is vast. A recent volume of West’s Northwestern Reporter 
includes cases concerning subjects as varied as insurance,
205
 probate,
206
 
procedural due process,
207
 investigative stops,
208
 attorney discipline,
209
 
divorce,
210
 involuntary commitment,
211
 workers’ compensation,212 freedom 
of information,
213
 governmental immunity,
214
 unemployment 
compensation,
215
 contracts,
216
 the Indian Child Welfare Act,
217
 expert 
witness testimony,
218
 medical malpractice,
219
 civil rights,
220
 secured 
transactions,
221
 taxation,
222
 and on and on. Each of these cases was decided 
by a generalist court, and for most it is easy to appreciate the allure of the 
 
 
 203. Id. at 117. Tetlock ultimately concludes that:  
[I]t does sometimes help to be a hedgehog. Distinctive hedgehog strengths include their 
resistance to distraction in environments with unfavorable signal-to-noise rations; their tough 
negotiating postures that protect them from exploitation by competitive adversaries; their 
willingness to take responsibility for controversial decisions guaranteed to make them 
enemies; their determination to stay the course with sound policies that run into temporary 
difficulties; and their capacity to inspire confidence by projecting a decisive, can-do presence. 
Id. at 164. 
 204. Id. at 118. 
 205. D & S Realty, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 789 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2010). 
 206. In re Estate of Muncillo, 789 N.W.2d 37 (Neb. 2010). 
 207. Scott v. County of Richardson, 789 N.W.2d 44 (Neb. 2010). 
 208. State v. Passerini, 789 N.W.2d 60 (Neb. 2010). 
 209. In re Lucas, 789 N.W.2d 73 (N.D. 2010). 
 210. McReath v. McReath, 789 N.W.2d 89 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 211. State v. Brown, 789 N.W.2d 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 212. Swiss Colony, Inc. v. Deutmeyer, 789 N.W.2d 129 (Iowa 2010). 
 213. Practical Political Consulting, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 789 N.W.2d 178 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 214. Dextrom v. Wexford Cnty., 789 N.W.2d 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010). 
 215. Sykes v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 789 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010). 
 216. Podraza v. New Century Physicians, LLC, 789 N.W.2d 260 (Neb. 2010). 
 217. In re Interest of Ramon N., 789 N.W.2d 272 (Neb. Ct. App. 2010). 
 218. State v. Huber, 789 N.W.2d 283 (S.D. 2010). 
 219. Schmiedt v. Loewen, 789 N.W.2d 312 (S.D. 2010). 
 220. Collins v. City of Kenosha Hous. Auth., 789 N.W.2d 342 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 221. Premier Cmty. Bank v. Schuh, 789 N.W.2d 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010). 
 222. Nw. Wisc. Cmty. Servs. Agency, Inc. v. City of Montreal, 789 N.W.2d 392 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2010). 
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suggestion that a court specialized in the area would have been able to 
grapple more easily with the case. Tax codes and other complex statutory 
schemes, to take just one example, do not often readily reveal their 
nuances to the occasional user. Those who work with them learn how the 
pieces fit together, and where the tensions, inconsistencies, and gaps are. It 
seems intuitively correct, then, that such judges would reach substantively 
better conclusions than their generalist peers.  
But consideration of the psychology of expertise should give us pause. 
As outlined above, American courts serve two functions, dispute 
resolution and law declaration, which are differentially distributed 
throughout the institutional hierarchy.
223
 And, again, the quality of a 
judicial decision will often be a contestable matter.
224
 This plays out 
somewhat differently in the two contexts. Questions of dispute resolution 
have theoretically correct answers—what the contract requires, whether 
the defendant was negligent, whether the trial court properly instructed the 
jury, and so forth. It is sometimes possible to detect error—such as when 
DNA evidence proves that a defendant was wrongly convicted—but 
neither consistently, nor reliably. An assessment of the relative qualitative 
performance of specialized courts is thus theoretically possible, but 
practically difficult. With respect to the lawmaking function, the question 
of quality lacks even these benchmarks. Measured by content, at least, 
there is no objective standard by which to say one is better than another. 
The question of whether specialization will result in better decisions, 
measured in terms of their content, is thoroughly value-laden. 
One lesson to be drawn is that law is a field in which there is no clear 
means of establishing who counts as an expert. It is easy to rank tennis and 
chess players, and not much more difficult to do so with pitchers and 
quarterbacks. When it comes to judges, however, there is no common 
metric even for generalists.
225
 To the extent it makes sense to distinguish 
between expert and nonexpert judges (as opposed to, say, regarding all or 
most judges as experts in some more general domain such as legal 
reasoning), the distinctions must necessarily be the product of rough 
consensus. As Yates and Tschirhart point out, such consensus is likely to 
 
 
 223. See supra Part I. 
 224. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 225. For a sustained effort to develop criteria to rank judges, see Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 19 (2005); 
Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of 
Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, A Tournament 
of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004). 
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arise out of a flawed process, fraught with cognitive bias.
226
 And as the 
preceding parenthetical suggests, the analysis must confront the domain-
specific nature of expertise. The domains in which a judge works might 
plausibly be defined broadly, such as legal reasoning or legal decision-
making, or narrowly, such as tax law or evidentiary rulings. Mid-level 
domains might include fact-finding, rule-identification, and the crafting 
and refinement of legal standards. A given judge might be skilled along 
one or some combination of these dimensions. And even a judge on a 
specialized court will have to adjudicate questions outside her specialty. 
Bankruptcy judges, for example, do not simply consider questions under 
the Bankruptcy Code, but instead “hear disputes from across the legal 
spectrum, confronting matters sounding in contract, tort, property, labor, 
and almost every other area of civil law.”227 If the bankruptcy judge is said 
to have a domain of expertise, then, it may be in a process rather than a 
subject matter.
228
 
Whatever the domains of expertise that judges may possess, the 
architecture of the American judiciary suggests that any gains resulting 
from expertise are almost certain to be of the efficiency rather than 
qualitative sort. Even if one accepts the proposition that there exists a form 
of expertise in which its holders cross some threshold that enables them to 
make qualitatively better decisions,
229
 and that law (or some parts of law) 
is a discipline in which that sort of expertise is attainable, the processes of 
judicial selection are unlikely to provide us with a judiciary that possesses 
that sort of expertise. Part of the problem is with the pool. The practice of 
law as generally undertaken does not reliably involve the sorts of 
processes necessary to cross the threshold. Lawyers who accrue 
experience in a given specialty are apt to reach a plateau of acceptable 
performance and remain there.
230
 Law practice does not mimic the sort of 
deliberate, structured practice necessary to continue to advance one’s 
abilities. The fortunate lawyer will have senior colleagues who, through 
the early years of her career, provide feedback on her work. But even this 
largely disappears after a few years, at which point her feedback will come 
from results and the reactions of her clients and peers, all of which is 
 
 
 226. See Yates & Tschirhart, supra note 162, at 450–52. 
 227. Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 747, 751 (2010). 
 228. See id. (emphasis in original) (“Bankruptcy may be a specialized process, with its own 
rhythms that differ from litigation in other forums, but the substance of bankruptcy cases is not 
specialized.”). 
 229. See supra Part II.A. 
 230. See supra note 132. 
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unstructured and sporadic. Her development does not parallel that of the 
professional athlete, whose entire career is overseen by coaches charged 
with identifying areas for improvement and developing plans to achieve it. 
The lawyer’s expertise is therefore likely to be a relative expertise. She 
will have been in a similar situation before, and thus will not have to 
expend time and energy wading through caselaw or a statutory scheme, or 
familiarizing herself with the processes by which the governing legal 
standards are implemented. But, she will often not have a good sense of 
whether her approach in those past situations was as effective as it could 
have been or of specific ways she should proceed differently this time. 
A specialized court or judge’s expertise will likewise be relative. Just 
as there is nothing about the practice of law that ensures the development 
of qualitative expertise, neither does the role of judge involve incremental 
increases in the difficulty or complexity of the cases one must decide. 
Indeed, the small amount of empirical research bearing on differences 
between generalist and specialist judges is consistent with this 
suggestion.
231
 The specialized court is therefore likely not to produce 
greater insight in some absolute sense, but rather roughly equivalent 
insight more quickly. As Yates and Tschirhart reveal, the subject-matter 
expert may have a comparative advantage in terms of identifying 
decisional options, but this does not inevitably translate into superior 
judgment.
232
 Tetlock’s work reinforces this conclusion, suggesting that it 
is cognitive style rather than expertise that drives decisional quality.
233
 The 
gains that result will not be negligible. A judge in familiar territory will 
undoubtedly be able to decide cases more efficiently than one who must 
make some degree of acquaintance with the subject matter with each new 
case. But it is important to recognize that any preference for a regime of 
specialists must be based on an accounting that considers both decisional 
quality and the amount of time that must be invested in each decision. 
There is, in other words, no assurance that the specialist’s decisions will 
be qualitatively better (assuming, again, some agreed metric for assessing 
quality) than the generalist’s, especially removing time and resource 
constraints from the analysis. 
 
 
 231. See Baum, supra note 23, at 1671. Baum characterizes a body of research conducted by 
Jeffrey Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie, and Andrew Wistrich as “provid[ing] significant evidence, perhaps 
unsurprising, that the basic reasoning processes of generalist and specialist judges do not differ 
fundamentally.” Id.; Cf. Wiliam K. Ford, Judging Expertise in Copyright Law, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
1, 49 (2006) (“While the evidence is not decisive, this study suggests that specialization does not 
improve copyright decisions.”). 
 232. See supra note 173–80 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra Part II.E. 
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Of course, quality measured by content or result is not the only aspect 
of judicial decision making to be accounted for in making the choice for or 
against specialization. Indeed, the focus might more profitably be on 
process differences between the two types of regimes rather than on 
substance. In this view, the focus would be on whether there are 
meaningful differences between the two regimes in terms of the manner in 
which judges operating in them go about making decisions, or differences 
in the manner in which those decisions are implemented or articulated.
234
 
Such differences, of course, might in turn affect decisional content in 
systematic ways. As the research on decision-making suggests, an 
approach focused on process may be superior to one focused purely on 
result.
235
 But, as the procedural justice literature demonstrates,
236
 there are 
senses apart from content in which process is consequential. We might as 
a society desire a system in which courts are responsive to parties, where 
decisions track governing law, or where there are more rules than 
standards, to a greater extent than we would value any specific content of 
rules. 
Tetlock’s revelation that cognitive style seems to drive decision 
making points the way to another possibility, which is that of devoting 
efforts to creating judicial processes that mimic fox-like cognitive styles. 
Adversarialism performs this function to some degree, ensuring that courts 
receive at least two perspectives on an issue. That benefit may be lost, 
however, if judges reach a point where they are merely categorizing rather 
than considering
237
 the alternatives, and as a consequence, achieving a 
meaningful impact on cognitive style might require strengthening the 
effects of adversarialism.
238
 In the context of multi-member courts, 
 
 
 234. For example, Ori Aronson has recently argued that specialization may promote democratic 
values. See Ori Aronson, Out of Many: Military Commissions, Religious Tribunals, and the 
Democratic Virtues of Court Specialization, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 231 (2011). He suggests that 
institutional heterogeneity may further democratic deliberation by providing distinct institutional 
homes for different voices and perspectives, enhance pluralism by ensuring “that multiple normative 
visions are active and visible at all times[,]” advance the cause of access to justice because different 
institutional arrangements provide different sorts of avenues to reach the judiciary, and enhance 
systemic transparency by “mak[ing] visible the doctrinal, institutional, and ideological divisions and 
distinctions that pervade the legal order.” Id. at 265–71. 
 235. See supra note 167. 
 236. See Tyler, supra note 101. 
 237. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 238. For example, we might consider implementing a “framing arguments” mechanism, pursuant 
to which a change to the format of judicial opinions—requiring that they include party-generated 
statements of the issues—would encourage judges to be more responsive to the parties. See Chad M. 
Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743 
(2006). 
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generalism might provide an advantage by increasing the likelihood of the 
need to accommodate divergent perspectives on a panel. Others have 
proposed similar mechanisms to ensure ideological diversity on panels.
239
 
There is a final set of concerns. The strongest arguments for a 
generalist judiciary seem to require the acceptance of a certain conception 
of law, and in turn of the judicial role. Stated simply, the conception of 
law that seems to underlie the generalist judiciary is one in which law 
strives to be something of a common language.
240
 There are at least two 
ideas at work here. One is that the expertise relevant to judging exists at a 
similarly broad level. In that view, the key is not expertise in or familiarity 
with the particulars of, say, tax law that matters, but rather an advanced 
ability to deploy the tools of legal analysis. The second idea extends 
beyond the act of judging to the impact of that act on the relationship 
between the law and those who are governed by it. It goes beyond the 
notion of a government of laws and not of men to the suggestion that 
legitimacy entails a government of laws that can be understood and 
adhered to by more-or-less ordinary people. The generalist judiciary can 
further these goals not only by preventing the sort of balkanization that is 
likely to occur if separate judiciaries have responsibility for their own 
areas of law, but also by serving as a more general barrier to needless 
technicality and complexity in the law. The presence of the generalist 
effectively requires specialist lawyers to translate their arguments into the 
 
 
 239. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, Colloquy, A Modest Proposal for Improving 
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (1999) (suggesting requirement that each federal court of 
appeals panel include at least one Democrat and Republican appointee). Additionally, Cass Sunstein 
and his co-authors suggest that: 
Ideological tendencies, whatever they are, can be distorting. In general, the existence of 
diversity on a three-judge panel is likely to bring the law to light and perhaps to move the 
panel’s decision in the direction of what the law requires. The existence of diverse judges and 
a potential dissent increases the probability that the law will be followed. And even where the 
law is unclear, it is valuable to have competing views about how it should be understood. 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? 
135 (2006).  
 240. The suggestion here is akin to James Boyd White’s characterization of law “as a language, as 
a set of ways of making sense of things and acting in the world.” JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM xiii (1990). Thus:  
In every opinion a court not only resolves a particular dispute one way or another, it validates 
or authorizes one form of life—one kind of reasoning, one kind of response to argument, one 
way of looking at the world and its own authority—or another. . . . Much of the life and 
meaning of an opinion (or a set of opinions) thus lies in the activities it invites or makes 
possible for judges, for lawyers, and for citizens; in the way it seeks to constitute the citizen, 
the lawyer, and the judge, and the relations among them; and in the kind of discoursing 
community it helps to create. 
Id. at 101–02. 
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common language of the generalist, which in turn facilitates the generality 
of law. This barrier provided by the generalist is hardly impermeable. It is 
not difficult to find examples of needless technicality and complexity in 
the law created by generalists. Nonetheless, one can easily imagine 
generalism serving as an antidote to some of the more severe pathologies 
that might afflict the law under a regime based more on specialization. 
This conception of law appears to be consistent with most theories of 
legality. A prominent example is Lon Fuller’s list of eight requirements 
for the “inner morality of law:”  
 [T]he attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may 
miscarry in at least eight ways; there are in this enterprise, if you 
will, eight distinct routes to disaster. The first and most obvious lies 
in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be 
decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to 
publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the 
rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive 
legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts 
the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under 
the threat of retrospective changes; (4) a failure to make rules 
understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules 
that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) 
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject 
cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.
241
 
Of course, whether a generalist judiciary truly is more effective than a 
specialized judiciary in satisfying Fuller’s requirements presents an 
empirical question as to which one can presently offer only speculation. 
As outlined more fully in Part I, one can make a plausible argument that 
generalist courts populated by generalist judges will do a better job, 
relative to the alternatives, of satisfying requirements one (achievement of 
rules), four (making rules understandable), five (avoiding contradiction), 
seven (maintaining consistency), and eight (maintaining congruence 
between rules and their administration). Insofar as it is appropriate to 
conceive of specialist judges as possessing some form of expertise, such 
effects might result because the experts are (at least implicitly) following 
 
 
 241. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39 (1964). For a more recent treatment of these 
ideas, see SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 392–98 (2011). 
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rules that are more complex than, and somewhat counter to, the governing 
doctrine as it has been articulated.
242
 Or it may be that the experts are more 
broadly, and less tangibly, assigning value to more data points in reaching 
a decision than the applicable rules provide for, and thus deciding 
according to some intuitive assessment of the equities.
243
 Either way, such 
results would be in tension with Fuller’s requirements. Rules of law 
created by generalists might typically resemble the decisional processes of 
novices in taking account of the more apparent features of a situation. To 
the extent that rule-ness is desirable, that will be a plus. The law declared 
by specialists, in contrast, is likely to be less precise, in the sense of being 
rule-like and generalizable, than that declared by generalists. 
It is also worth considering the possibility that research exploring 
creativity and decision-making expertise captures what qualitative 
approaches to expertise regard as constituting the difference between 
experts and novices. The qualitative expert may be one who has the 
knowledge base of a relative expert (to a high degree), and who has also 
developed a sort of process-based facility, whether it be creativity, 
decision-making skill, or the sort of superior cognitive approach outlined 
by Tetlock. The situation becomes even more complex when one attempts 
to apply it to the judicial role. Our society is ambivalent about the 
desirability of judicial creativity. On the one hand, a creative judiciary 
might be viewed as an important—perhaps even necessary—source of 
solutions to pressing social problems.
244
 In similar fashion, judicial 
creativity might be applied to the resolution of discrete disputes between 
litigants as to which formal law provides little guidance.
245
 On the other 
hand, a judge who reaches a creative result might be accused of acting 
contrary to the institutional logic of the adversary system, which relies 
upon and must be responsive to the parties’ conception of their disputes.246 
 
 
 242. It is easy to appreciate how there might come to be a mismatch between the levels of 
generality at which the legal standards articulate the law and the depth at which a specialist analyzes it. 
A statute or line of precedent will have been developed largely by generalists. Even though subject-
matter experts often play a role, such as in statutory advisory committees, the product will have been 
filtered through the generalist lawmaker. The mere existence of that filter seems likely to affect the 
work product of the specialist advisors, and the lawmakers themselves are likely to modify what is 
proposed before it is enacted. Thus, the rules and standards that result are likely to identify a limited 
set of factors as appropriate for consideration, while the specialist/expert will tend to look beyond that 
limited set of factors to more deep structural considerations. See supra Part II.B. 
 243. See supra Part II.D. 
 244. E.g., CHARLES MONROE HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE AND AUDACIOUS 
JUDGES 130–31 (1996). 
 245. See generally Sarah Evans Barker, Beyond Decisional Templates: The Role of Imaginative 
Justice in the Trial Court, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 667 (2009). 
 246. See Oldfather, supra note 82, at 139–43. 
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More broadly, a creative judicial decision seems more likely to be 
regarded as one that is insufficiently deferential to the political branches or 
otherwise of the sort susceptible to the amorphous but undoubtedly 
pejorative “judicial activism” label. 
The entire inquiry into the relative merits of specialization vis-à-vis the 
rule of is subject to a possible qualification: Embedded within this 
discussion is a conception of law as necessarily consisting of a unified 
whole, which must collectively satisfy these requirements. Having a 
common language is important only if there is some commonality to the 
tasks in which all lawyers and judges are engaged. If, on the other hand, 
criminal law and patent law and workers compensation law and so forth 
are sufficiently different in a qualitative sense, then this unified conception 
of law may be erroneous. On that view the better approach would be to 
discard the notion of “law” as inherently including common threads that 
run through all these areas and instead having distinct bodies of law each 
of which should be assessed by Fuller’s criteria. In this latter world, there 
may be benefit to not having them share a common language, in which 
case many of the arguments for a generalist judiciary as I have defined it 
would fall away.
247
 
CONCLUSION 
It would be ironic, to say the least, were I to conclude an article that 
draws heavily on research touting the cognitive prowess of Berlin’s foxes 
by offering confident solutions. Attempts to import the findings of 
psychological research into the legal system are always tricky,
248
 and 
doubly so when that research itself leads to no easily delineated 
conclusions. The standard admonitions against the incautious importation 
of the results of psychological experimentation into “real world” settings 
take on additional salience when the setting is one in which there are 
conflicting views as to the ultimate goals to be achieved. Courts and law 
serve multiple, often incompatible, ends. Though the conclusions must 
therefore necessarily be modest and qualified, they are nonetheless 
significant. Determining whether judicial specialization makes sense in 
 
 
 247. Aronson suggests something along these lines: “The concept of the ‘court’ as a solid, 
identifiable, coherent, and persistent institutional entity is revealed to be obsolete. What most states 
and countries have, in fact, is a profusion of courts—multiple, diverse, and continuously changing 
devices of legal ordering and dispute resolution.” Aronson, supra note 234, at 297 (emphasis in 
original). 
 248. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be 
Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002). 
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any given context is a considerably more complex question than most 
previous analyses have allowed for. And claims that expertise necessarily 
translates into superior decision-making are likewise subject to 
considerable qualification, if they are not outright suspect. 
Questions of specialization and expertise exist throughout society, as 
debates over the wisdom of specialization in medicine and academia attest. 
They also exist throughout law. The psychology of expertise has 
implications not merely for judging, but also for the design and operation 
of institutions and roles like administrative agencies and expert witnesses. 
My analysis suggests that it may be appropriate to revisit those contexts as 
well. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/3
